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pensing of all business-related nonfinancial purchases, and (2)
an individual tax with progressive marginal rates on a base of all
wages and pension receipts plus gifts and inheritances received.
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This report examines the possibility of using a  terms of the standard criteria of simplicity,
direct tax on consumption as a replacement for  equ`ty, economic neutrality and efficiency, and
an existing income tax within the context of a  consistency with economic growth.  The discus-
developing country.  The structural differences  sion focuses on issues that are particularly
between income and consumption taxes are  relevant in a developing country context, and
described, and some simple examples are used  argues (primarily on simplicity grounds) that a
to illustrate the basic differences in the taxation  consumption tax may well be preferable to an
of businesses and individuals under the two  income tax as the form of direct taxation in a
approaches.  A variety of critical structural  developing country.
featurzs of a direct consumption tax are ad-
dressed, including (1) the rationale for including  After a detailed discussion of the choice
a business tax in a consumption-based tax  between cash flow and tax prepayment treatment
system, (2) the treatment of debt at the business  at the individual level under a direct consump-
level, (3) the differences between "cash flow"  tion tax, the analysis concludes that for simplic-
and "tax prepayment" treatment at the individual  ity reasons the individual tax prepayment
level, and (4) altemative means of taxing gifts  approach is the more appropriate one in the
and bequests at the individual level.  developing country context. The report then
describes the structure and implementation of
The report includes a brief survey of the  such a direct consumption tax. The discussion
extensive literature on the choice between  includes an examination of intemational and
income and consumption as the basis for a  transitional issues, and also comments on the
system of direct taxation. This survey compares  desirability and feasibility of supplementary
the .- elative merits of the two approaches in  wealth taxes and taxation on a presumptive
basis.
This paper is a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics De-
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Recent  years  have seen  the  development  of two  important  trends  in
the area of consumption taxation.  First, and most obvious, is the
ascendancy  of the  value added tax (VAT)  as the preferred  form of broad-
based tax, in bothl  developed and developing  countries.  As little  as
twenty-five  years  ago, the  VAT existed  only in France,  and  even there  in
only a very rudimentary  form.  Since then,  adoption  of the  VAT has been
made a prerequisite  for membership in the European Economic  Community
(EEC),  several  European  countries  that are not members  of the EEC have
adopted  the  VAT,  and  the  tax  has  spread  throughout  the  Third  World.  In  all
some  forty  countries  now  utilize  the  VAT. 1
Paralleling  the rise of the use of the VAT has been increased
interest  in a different  form  of consumption  tax,  a direct  tax that  can  be
tailored  to the  economic  circumstances  of the  taxpayer. Direct  consumption
taxes  have  been given  such  names  as an expenditure  tax,  a personal  tax  on
consumption,  a tax  on consumed  income,  a cash flow  lifetime  income  tax,  a
personal  exemption  VAT, the Simplified  Alternative  Tax, and simply  "Plan
x...12  Academic  economists  have been interested  in taxes of this type
primarily  because  they generally  do not alter  the terms  cn which  present
consumption  can be exchanged  for future  consumption;  under  certain  highly
1/  See  Shoup  (forthcoming),  and  Tait (forthcoming).
2/  Among standard  references  are Andrews  (1974),  Bradford  (1980,  1986),
Lodin (1978),  Institute  for Fiscal  Studies  (1978),  Aaron and Calper
(1985),  Mieszkowski  (1977,  1980),  and  U.S. iiepartment  of the  Treasury
(1977).-2-
restrictive  assumptions,  a consumption  tax  that  exhibits  such  intertemporal
neutrality  is an "optimal  tax" in the  sense  that  it minimizes  tax-induced
distortions  in individual  decision  making. 3 Opponents  of the doub'E
taxation  of capital  income  inherent  in the  traditional  income  tax  favor  a
switch to a tax based on consumption  for a somewhat different  though
related  reason:  it is believed  that such a switch  would  stimulate  saving
and capital formation.  To others, the attraction  of a  tax based on
consumption  is quite  different. They see  the  possibility  of avoiding  the
two most difficult  income  measurement  problems  that are inherent  in the
implementation  of an income  tax; specifically,  under a consumption-based
direct tax, timing  issues  do not exist,  and there is no necessity  for
inflation  adjustment  in the  measurement  of income. 4
The focus  of this  report  is  on the  possibility  of using  a direct
tax  on consumption  as a replacement  for  existing  income  taxes,  a topic  on
which little  has been written in the developing  country  context. 5 The
3/  See Bradford (1980),  King (1980),  or Feldstein  (1978).  Note that
intertemporal  neutrality  is  achieved  only  with  constant  tax  rates.
4/  For  such  an argument,  see  King (1980). McLure  (forthcoming),  explains
in greater  detailr  the difficulties  created  by timing  issues  and the
need  for  inflation  adjustment.
5/  Experience  with  direct  consumption  taxes  in developing  (and  developed)
countries  has been very limited.  India  and Sri Lanka (then  Ceylon)
both twice  tried and then abandoned  a personal  expenditure  tax more
than twenty  years  ago.  In these  cases,  the direct  expenditure  taxes
were  abolished  on the  grounds  that  administrative  costs  were  high  while
revenue  yields  were low.  (See  Cutt,  1969 and  Goode,  1962 and 1984.)
These  experiences  appear  to  have  limited  current  relevance. The  direct
consumption  taxes  in India  and Sri Lanka  were quite  limited  in scope,
as they were applied at relatively  low rates to only high income
individuals. Moreover,  they were structured  following  a "cash  flow"
approach, rather than a "tax prepayment"  approach;  these terms are
explained  below, where we argue that administrative  considerations
suggest that  the  tax prepayment  approach  is clearly  the  more
appropriate  method  of direct  taxation  of consumption  in a developing
country  context. Thus the  negative  experiences  of India  and  Sri  Lanka
are of quite  limited  relevance  for the  type  of direct  consumption  tax
that  is the primary  focus of  this paper  --  a broad-based  tax that
follows  the  tax  prepayment  approach.-3-
report  is organized  as follows. In Section  II we describe  the  structural
differences  between income  and consumption  taxes,  and also discuss two
different  approaches  to direct  consumption  taxation.  We provide  some  simple
examples  that  illustrate the basic  differences in the  taxation of
businesses  and  individuals  under  the  income  and  consumption  tax
alternat'.ves.  (The  discussion  of  business  taxation  issues  is  applicable  to
both direct  and indirect  consumption  taxes,  while the individual  taxation
examples  are relevant  only for  direct  consumption  taxes.) We discuss  two
alternative  methods  of individual  consumption-based  taxation  --  the cash
flow and  tax prepayment approaches.  The  section also includes an
explanation  of  why  certain  forms  of direct  consumption  taxation  are  thought
to be inappropriate  in a developing  country  context  and therefore  are not
considered  further  in the  paper.
Section  III  contains  a relatively  brief  discussion  of the reasons
a  developing  country  might  consider  basing  direct  taxation  on consumption
rather  than  on income. We compare  the two  taxes  in terms  of the  standard
criteria of simplicity,  equity,  economic  neutrality  and efficiency,  and
cc-sistency  with economic  growth. Section  IV compares  the  relative  merits
of tt.  individual  cash  flow  and  tax  prepayment  consumption  tax  alternatives
in  a developing  country  context. We argue  that  the  most  appealing  approach
is the  combination  of a  business  tax  that  allows  expensing  for  purchases  of
fixed  assets  with an individual  tax  based  on the  tax  prepayme.Lt  approach;
the individual  tax base should include  gifts and inheritances  received
(with no offsetting deduction for the donor or testator),  and should
perhaps be supplemented  by an individual  wealth tax.  Section  V  then
discusses  the structure  and implementation  of such a direct  consumption
tax; it includes  a discussion  of international  and transitional  issues.
Some  concluding  comments  ars  offered  in  Section  VI.- 4 -
It may be useful to comment  at the outset  on the relationship
between  the direct  consumption  tax options  discussed  in this report  and
indirect  consumption  taxes  like  the  VAT,  especially  since  use  of the  VAT  is
widespread  in the developing  cai-:  tries.  One can easily  make a case for
replacing  a VAT with a direct  ccnaumption  tax.  The primary  argument  for
such  a reform  is that  equity  goal,  especially  the  elimination  of  burdens  on
low-income  households,  are addressed  in a straightforward  fashion  under  a
direct  consumption  tax through  the  appropriate  use of personal  exemptions,
itemized deductions, and a progressive marginal rate structure; by
comparison, freeing low-income households of tax and offsetting the
regressivity  of a VAT through  the use of tax credits  or special  rates
and/or  exemptions  results  in a great  deal  of revenue  loss,  complexity,  and
economic  inefficiency. 6 Of course,  it is  must  be admitted  that imposition
of a consumption-based  direct  tax would also involve  complexities  that
would be difficult for a developing  country to handle and that might
therefore  also  create  inefficiencies  as  well  as inequities.
However,  it is more  likely  that  a direct  consumption  tax  would  be
implemented  as a  substitute  for an income tax and a complement  to an
existing  VAT or other indirect  consumption  tax.  There  would be several
disadvantages  to such an approach.  Since  both consumption  taxes  have
similar  (but  not  identical)  bases,  such  a system  would  be rather  redundant,
and  would  likely  increase  administrative  and  compliance  costs  relative  to  a
single,  higher-rate  direct  consumption  tax; this  would  be especially  true
to the extent  that  different  accounting  rules  were required  under  the  two
6/  On the  VAT,  see  McLure  (1987). For  a comparison  of direct  and indirect
taxation  of consumption  in the  U.S.  context,  see  Zodrow  (1988). That
paper argues  that a direct  consumption  tax would  be appropriate  as a
supplement  to an existing  income  tax; in this report,  we focus on
completely  replacing  an income  tax  with  a direct  consumption  tax.taxes.  A major  advantage of the direct approach is that personal
exemptions  and  deductions  serve  to eliminate  tax  on the  consumption  of the
very  poor;  under  a system  with  both  types  of consumption  taxes,  some  of the
consumption  of the  very poor  would  be subject  to the  VAT,  with exemptions
under  the  direct  tax  freeing  lower  and  middle  income  groups  from  taxation.
The  main advantage  of the  VAT - better  compliance  due to the inclusion  of
wages  at the  firm  level  - could  also  be achieved  under  a direct  consumption
tax through  the  use of withholding  taxes  on wages. 7 Thus, simultaneous
use of the VAT and a direct  consumption  tax generally  seems  undesirable.
In any  case,  for  the  balance  of this  report  (with  the  exception  of a short
discussion  of wealth  taxes  in Section V), we  consider the direct
consumption  tax  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of the  tax  system. 8
II.  INCOME  AND  CONSUMPTION  TAXES:  STRUCTURAL  ISSUES
This section considers  a variety of structural issues  in the
taxation  of income  and consumption.  First,  we provide  several  simple
numerical  examples  which illustrace  the  basic differences  between  income-
based  and  consumption-based  taxation  of  businesses  and  individuals.  We also
consider  two alternative  ways of implementing  an individual  consumption-
based  direct  tax --  the  cash flow  and tax  prepayment  approaches. To make
7/  It may appear that the VAT would be more effective  than a direct
consumption  tax in reaching  tax evaders,  since  they  would  have to pay
tax in the form  of higher  prices. As noted  by Bradford  (1986),  this
purported  advantage  is largely  illusory;  tax  evaders  could  keep their
real incomes constant  by raising the prices they charge  for their
services (since their taxpaying  competitors  would have to increase
prices  to  cover  the  VAT).
8/  In particular,  we do not consider  any relationships  between direct
consumption  taxes  and  social  security  taxes  or  export/import  taxes.- 6 -
the  analysis  tractable,  we restrict  our  discussion  to those  Zorms  of direct
consumption taxation that are most relevant in a developing country
context;  accordingly,  this section  also includes  an explanation  of why we
believe  certain  forms  of direct  consumption  taxation  are inappropriate  in a
developing country context and are  therefore precluded from further
consideration  in  the  report.
A.  Consumption  Versus  Income  Tax  Treatment  of Businesses
1.  Taxing  Businesses  Under  a ConsumRtion-Based  Tax
Some consumption  tax advocates  support  complete  elimination  of
taxation  at the  business  level. In  principle,  this  is consistent  with the
notion  of taxation  of consumption  since,  neglecting  problems  of personal
consumption  disguised  as business  expenditures,  only individuals  consume.
However, it is fairly  easy to design  a business  tax that is generally
consistent  with consumption  tax principles.  Moreover,  for the reasons
detailed below, such a  "consumption-based"  business tax provides an
important  complement  to consumption  taxation  at the  individual  level.
Such a consumption-based business tax would allow immediate
expensing for all business-related  expenditures,  including  additions  to
inventories  and  purchases  of depreciable  assets  and  other  expenditures  that
might normally be capitalized or amortized over several years under
ordinary accounting  principles.  (For exnesitional  convenience  we will
generally  use  the  term  "depreciable  assets"  to  refer  to  all  expenditures  of
the  latter  type in  what follows.) Such  a tax is  also  commonly  referred  to
as a business  "cash  flow"  tax. 9 This terminology  arises  from the  fact
9/  As indikated  below,  the tax  treatment  of borrowing  and lending  and of
interest  income  and  expense  must  be consistent  with that  of depreciable
assets;  for now this point is ignored,  except  to note that interest
income  is effectively  (and perhaps  statutorily)  exempt  from tax and
interest  expense  is  effectively  (and  perhaps  statutorily)
non-deductible.-7-
that the tax  base is defined  to include  eeceipts  and  allow  deductions  for
non-financial  business expanditures  on a cash flow basis;  this is in
contrast  to an income  tax  where  receipts  and  expenditures  are in  principle
treated  on an accrual  basis.  (Note  that this cash flow or consumption-
based  business  tax  is  to  be distinguished  from  the  individual  cash  flow  tax
discussed  below.) As will be demonstrated  below,  the implication  of such
treatment  is that,  in present  value  terms,  capital  income  is exempt  from
tax.
We believe  such a business  tax is desirable  within  a cons  zion
tax  framework  for  at least  five  reasons. First,  the  government  will  obtain
positive  revenue  in  present  value  terms  from  all  inframarginal  investments.
Natural  resources  and industries  not subject  to strong  competitive  forces
are  particularly  important  sources  of inframarginal  returns,  especially  in
resource-rich  countries and in developing  countries  where ill-advised
government  policies  commo.aly  create  monopoly  profits. To the  extent  such
inframarginal  returns  are taxed,  the  business  tax  supplements  the  revenue
raised  from taxes  on individual  consumption  and  allows  lower  tax  rates  on
personal consumption.  Moreover, the business  tax is likely to be a
relatively  efficient  source  of revenue,  since inframarginal  rather than
marginal  returns  are  being  taxed.
Second,  in  a system  of  direct  taxation  the  existence  of  a business
tax  is probably  indispensable  from  a political  standpoint.  The  perception
problems  associated  with  complete  elimination  of  business  taxation  would  be
enormous  in  most if  not  all  developl.Lg  countries.
Third,  such  a tax  provides  a convenient  means  for taxing  foreign
investors  if such taxation  is deemed  desirable. Revenues  are raised  from
inframarginal  investments,  which may be an important  component  of much
foreign  investment  in  developing  countries,  simply  by applying  the  rules  of
the  consumption-based business  tax  to  foreign-owned branches  andsubsidiaries.  Additional  withholding taxes on dividends or interest
remitted  abroad  can  be assessed,  if  deemed  desirable.
Fourth,  in the  absence  of a  business  tax  it  would  be difficult  to
prevent owners  of businesses  from disguising  personal consumption
expenditures  as tax-deductible  business  purchases. The cash-flow  business
tax  provides  a  vehicle for preventing such abuses, since personal
consumption expenses would theoretically not be deductible  from the
business  tax  base.  Of course,  structuring  rules  that  differentiate  between
legitimate  business  expenses  and disguised  personal  expenditures  is not
simple  under  either  a consumption  tax  or an income  tax. Denial  (partial  or
full)  of business  deductions  for  expenditures  on fringe  benefits  that  are
tax-exempt  when received  by individuals  also  provides  a means  of limiting
this  form  of tax  avoidance.
Finally,  a business  tax is  desirable  because  it  makes  it possible
to assess  taxes  on income  from investments  made under the  pre-reform  tax
regime  and thus  prevent  the  enactment  of a consumption  tax  from  conferring
a  windfall  gain  to the  owners  of capital  existing  at the  time  of enactment.
The  magnitude  of such  taxes  would  obviously  depend  on the transition  rules
applied  to receipts  from  and deductions  related  to investments  made under
the  pre-reform  regime.
In  our  view,  these  reasons  for  maintaining  a separate  business  tax
within  any direct  consumption  tax framework  are  compelling. Accordingly,
we rest;ict  our evaluation  of consumption  tax alternatives  for  developing
countries  to those  plans  which  include  a consumption-based  business  tax.
2.  Additional  Features  of  a Consumption-Based  Business  Tax
We restrict  the  consumption-based  business  tax  under  consideration
in this report  in three  further  ways.  In each  case,  we believe  that the
treatment specified is clearly appropriate  for any developing  country
contemplating  a switch  to  a direct  tax  based  on  consumption.9  -
First, we assume that businesses  get a deduction for pension
contributions,  with pension  benefits  being  included  in the individual  tax
base  when received. Alternative  approaches  which  would  also  be consistent
with taxation  on the  basis  of consumption  could  be designed. However,  the
treatment  specified  is recommended  by all consumption  tax proponents  for
administrative  reasons;  we follow  this  convention  in  the  report.
Second, we assume that the business  tax rate is equal to the
maximum individual  tax rate and that this rate applies  to all business
"income". ("Income"  is placed  in quotation  marks  because  the  base of the
business  tax is not actually  income,  for reasons  to be explained  below.)
This rate structure  eliminates  the potential  for tax avoidance  schemes
based  on differences  (in  either  direction)  between  the  maximum  individual
and  business  rates  and  the  inequities  and  distortions  caused  by
preferential  rates that favor investment  by "small"  businesses.  In the
aggregate,  this choice  almost  certainly  provides  desirable  protection  for
the  progressivity  of the  tax  system. But  in  particular  cases,  it is  likely
to violate  vertical  equity  by subjecting  income  attributable  to low income
taxpayers  who own  corporate  shares  (or  participate  in the  earnings  of non-
corporate  businesses  subject  to the cash flow business  tax) to the top
marginal rate.  Unlike the traditional  income  tax, a consumption-based
direct  tax  would  not cause  tax-induced  capital  flight,  since  the  effective
tax  rate  applied  to income  from  marginal  investment  is zero.
Third, we assume that all businesses  are subject to the same
business tax, regardless  of their form of organization (corporation,
partnership,  proprietorship,  etc.).  This means that no organizational
forms  are provided  with special  tax treatment  which allows  them to avoid
the business tax by passing through  income  and losses  to their owners.
Such treatment avoids tax-induced  distortions  in the form of business
organization  and the economic distortions  that may result if certain- 10  -
activities  must,  for non-tax reasons, employ a  particular form of
organization.  It also improves  both  equity  and  the  perception  of equity  by
providing  for uniform  treatment of all business activity, thereby
preventing  affluent  taxpayers  from using tax-preferred  business  forms  as
tax  shelters. Finally,  it simplifies  the  tax  code in two important  ways.
First, it eliminates the need to define and enforce the rules that
distinguish  which  entities  qualify  for  "pass  through"  treatment.  Second,  it
eliminates  the complexities  associated  with auditing  many partners  rather
than  a single  firm.
3.  The  Treatment  of Bus:_'ness  Investment  and  Debt
Given  the  decision  to include  a  business  tax  of the  type  specified
above  in the  consumption  tax  framework,  the  primary  differences  in the tax
treatment  of businesses  under  an income  tax  and a consumption  tax are in
the tax treatments accorded purchases of depreciable  assets and the
principal and interest on loans.  We consider first the treatment  of
equity-financed  purchases  of depreciable  assets,  and then  discuss  how  debt
finance  affects  the  analysis.
The conventional  Haig-Simons  definition  of the tax base under a
tax  on real  economic  income  is the sum  of consumption  plus changes  in net
wealth.  For  firms, this definition implies that the purchase of a
depreciable  asset,  in and of itself,  should  generate  no deduction;  since
money is exchanged  for an asset of equal  value, there is no immediate
change  in net wealth.  According  to this reasoning,  deductions  should  be
allowed  only to the extent  that loss in the economic  value of the asset
results  in changes  in the net wealth  of the firm.  Thus, in any single
year,  a  deduction  is allowed  only  for  the  estimated  economic  depreciation
- - the loss in economic  value - - of the asset.  These deductions  can be
used to offset  gross  returns  to the investme-  t,  which are included  in the
tax base upon receipt.  For example, consider  an all equity-financed- 11  -
purchase  of a $1,000  asset  which  depreciates  $100  in the  first  year  of  use.
Under  an income  tax,  the  expenditure  of $1,000  in the  first  year  is largely
offset  by an increase  in the  firm's  holdings  of fixed  assets  of $900;  thus,
a deduction  of only $100 is allowed  against  the returns  generated  by the
asset  in the  first  year  of operation,  with  subsequent  deductions  similarly
based  on the  further  economic  depreciation  of the  asset.
In marked  contrast,  under a consumption-based  business  tax, all
expenditures  on  depreciable  assets  are  deducted  in  the  year  of  purchase,  or
"expensed." In terms of the example  above,  a deduction  for the entire
purchase  price  of $1,000  would  be allowed  in  year  one.
The effects of  these two alternative  treatments of business
investment  can be demonstrated  with a simple  two-period  model.  (In the
discussion  of this model only the tax levied  at the business  level is
considered;  individual  taxes  levied  on  bondholders  and  shareholders  are  not
considered.)  Although  highly  stylized,  the  model  captures  the essential
differences  between  income  and  consumption  tax  treatment  of investment.
Consider  an asset  purchased  on December  31 of Year 1 for $1,000
that  lasts  exactly  one  year  and  has  no residual  value. The  asset  generates
gross receipts  of $1,100  in Year 2, so that the real internal  rate of
return  to the  investment  is 10  percent.  (Note  that  all returns  are  assumed
to  be real.  Inflation  is a separate  issue  that  is ignored  in the  analysis
below. 10 This rate is also the discount  rate used by the firm to
calculate present values of future cash flows; this implies that the
investment  is  marginal  in that  the  rate  of return  is exactly  equal  to the
opportunity  cost  of funds.
10/  For  a discussion  of the  effects  of inflation  within  the  context  of this
model,  see  McLure  (1987).- 12 -
In order  to  compare  expenditures.  and  receipts  occurring  in the  two
different  years,  it is necessary  to convert  all  monetary  quantities  into
present values of one of the years.  Since all returns  and deductions
except  the deduction  for expensing  occur in Year 2, it is convenient  to
measure  all monetary  quantities  in present  values  of Year 2, rather  than
following  the  usual  practice  Df  measuring  all  quantities  in  Year 1 present
values.  An analysis  in Year 1 present  values  would, of course,  yield
identical  qualitative  results.
The marginal tax rate faced by the firm is assumed to be 30
percent,  and the firm is assumed  to  have other  sources  of income  that  may
be offset  by the deductions  generated  by the investment. Expensing  under
the consumption  tax alternative  results  in a Year 1 deduction  of $1,000,
which  has  a  Year 2  value  of $1,100. Economic  depreciation  allowances  under
the  income  tax  alternative  results  in  a  Year  2 deduction  of $1,000.
The  results  for  the  two  cases  are  as follows. For  the  income  tax,
gross  receipts  in  Year 2  of $1,100 less  a deduction  of $1,000  for  economic
depreciation  result  in taxable  income  of $100.  Taxable  income  thus  equals
economic income, which is equal to the internal  rate of return  of 10
percent  times  the investment  of $1,000. The tax paid in Year 2 is $30.
Thus,  the effective  tax rate,  defined  as the tax  paid divided  by economic
income,  is equal  to  the statutory  income tax  rate  of  30 percent
(0.30-30/100).
The  results  are  quite  different  in the  consumption  tax  case  where
expensing  is allowed.  The  Year 2 value  of expensing  ($1,100)  equals  the
value  of gross  receipts. Thus,  the  present  value  of the  business  ta-  base
under  the consumption  tax is zero,  which in turn implies  a zero effective
tax  rate.- 13 -
This  simple  example  demonstrates  the  sense  in  which  a  business  tax
that allows  expensing  is consistent  with the notion  of taxing  personal
consumption. That is, the  business  tax imposes  no tax  burden  in present
value terms  on income  from marginal  investments;  if all investments  were
marginal,  the  ent.re  burden  of such a tax  system,  again  in present  value
terms,  would  be due  to  the  consumption-based  tax  assessed  at the  individual
level.
Another  way  of viewing  the  effects  of expensing  is also
instructive.  Expensing  costs the government  $300 in Year 1 since the
firm's taxes are reduced by that amount.  In Year 2, the government
receives  $330 in tax revenue.  This "tax revenue"  is best viewed  as a
return  on the  government's  "share"  of the  investment  purchased  through  the
reduction  in the firm's  taxes  in Year 1; the government  in effect  is a
"silent  partner"  in the  venture,  sharing  in both the  risk and the  return.
On a marginal  investment  such as the one analyzed,  the present  value  of
taxes on gross receipts  generated  by the investment  exactly  equals  the
present  value  of the foregone  revenue;  that  is, the  government's  share  of
the investment  earns the same 10 percent  return  earned  by the investor.
(Note  that  the investor  effectively  invests  only $700 in  Year 1 and earns
net receipts  of $770 in Year 2.  That the investor  receives  the full 10
percent return on the $700 investment further demonstrates  that the
effective  tax rate is zero.)  Viewing the government's  participation  in
investment  implied  by expensing  in this  way  helps  to reconcile  the  apparent
inconsistency  between  the  result  of a zero  marginal  effective  tax  rate  and
the  fact  that  tax  revenue  is  being  collected  under  such  a system. 11
11/  Whether  any  revenue  is  collected  in  the  steady  state  depends  on  whether
the  internal  rate  of return  exceeds  the  growth  rate  of investment;  see
McLure  (1987).- 14 -
This  example is easily modified to analyze the effects of
expensing  for  an inframarginal  investment,  that is,  one  where  the rate  of
return  exceeds the discount  rate.  Consider  the above example  when the
investment  results  in gross  receipts  of $1200,  so that the gross  rate of
return  is 20 percent. Under  the income  tax,  gross  receipts  less  economic
depreciation  yield  taxable  and  economic  income  of $200  in  Year 2, implying
taxes  of $60.  The  effective  tax  rate  is again  equal  to the  statutory  rate
of 30  percent  (0.30-60/200).
For the  consumption  tax,  gross  receipts  of $1200  less  a deduction
for  expensing  equal  to $1,100  in  Year 2 dollars  results  in a business  tax
base equal  to $100  and a tax  of $30.  This result  can  be interpreted  in a
numc'er  of ways.  The  average  effective  tax  rate,  again  defined  as tax  paid
divided  by economic  income,  is 15 percent  (0.15-30/200). Alternatively,
the  business  tax  can be viewed  as assessing  tax at the  statutory  rate  on
inframarginal or above-normal  returns; that is, the tax rate on the
inframarginal  return  of $100 is 30 percent (0.30-30/100). The marginal
effective  tax  rate  (on  the  normal  returns  to the  investment)  is  still  zero,
fs  in the  previous  example.
However,  the  most instructive  way to interpret  the  results  in the
case of consumption  tax treatment  of an inframarginal  investment  is as
follows. Recall  that  under  the  "government  risk-sharing"  interpretation  of
the effects  of expensing,  the  government's  share  of the $1,000  investment
is $300, and the investor's  share is the remaining  $700.  Consider  the
returns  to these  two  components  of the investment. The  investor  receives
$840  in  Year 2 ($1,200  in gross  receipts  less  $360  in taxes  paid  under  the
consumption-based  business  tax).  Thus, the investor  receives  the full  20
percent  return  on his investment  of $700.  Simultaneously,  the government
receives  $360  on its  "investment"  of $300;  thus,  like  the  private  investor
the government earns 20 percent on  its investment.  In short, the- 15  -
government  is  a partner  in  the  inframarginal  returns  to investment,  as  well
as in  the  marginal  returns. 12
To summarize,  the government  risk-sharing  interpretation  of the
effects of expensing  implies  that private  returns to both marginal  and
inframarginal  investments  are exempt  under a consumption-based  business
tax.  Thus,  capital  income  is effectively  exempt  from  tax, and the  entire
tax  burden  on individuals,  again  in  present  value  terms,  is  attributable  to
the taxation  of consumption  at the individual  level. The government  does
receive net  positive  revenue  in present value  terms under such a
consumption-based  business  tax.  This net positive  revenue  arises  only in
t..-  case of investments  that yield inframarginal  returns;  it equals the
inframarginal  returns  on the  government's  share  of the  investment.
Analogous  results  can  be obtained  when  debt  finance  is  considered.
However,  the  tax  treatment  of debt is  quite  different  under  the  income  and
consumption  tax approaches. Under the income  tax, interest  payments  are
deductible  from the  business  tax  base (and  interest  receipts  are taxable).
Consider  the first  example  above (with  gross  receipts  of $1100)  when the
investment  is  80  percent  debt-financed  and  the  interest  rate  is  10  percent.
12/  The  government  receives  $330  in  present  values  of  Year 1.  This implies
that  the  government  receives  revenue  that  is  positive  in  present  value
terms;  that  is.  net revenue  in  Year 1  present  values  is  $30.  The  most
straightforward  interpretation  of this result  is that the government
earns  --  in  the  form  of revenue  that  is  positive  in  present  value  terms
--  the  inframarginal  return  on  its  share  of  the  investment
(30-300x(0.2-0.1)). Alternatively,  the government  does not merely
receive  the  value  of its  original  investment  of  $300 (which  equals  $330
in  Year  2 present  values);  it  also  earns  an additional  $30  in  Year  2 --
the  amount  of inframarginal  return  on its  share  of the  investment.- 16 -
Gross  receipts  of  $1,100  are offset  by  a deduction  for  economic
depreciation  of $1,000  and an interest  deduction  of $80.  Taxable  income
(which  is  equal  to  economic  income)  is  only  $20  and  tax  is  $6.  However,the
equity  invested  in the  project  is only $200,  so that the  after-tax  return
to equity  is 7 percent  (0.07-14/200).  This implies  that  the  effective  tax
rate on equity is  igain equal to the statutory rate of 30 percent
(0.30-6/20).  (Recall,  however,  that  this  approach  calculates  effective  tax
rates  at the  firm  level,  and  thus  neglects  additional  individual  taxes  paid
on interest  and  on the  return  to equity.)
Under  the  consumption-based  business  tax,  there  are  two
alternative  methods  of treating  principal  and interest  on loans;  neither
alters  the  results  presented  above. The simplest  method  is to ignore  loan
proceeds and repayments  and interest  payments  and receipts  altogether.
This approach  obviously  has  no effect  on the  calculations  of effective  tax
rates  presented  above. (This  method  of treating  debt corresponds  to the
treatment  of debt under the individual  tax  prepayment  approach  described
below.)
The alternative  approach  is to include  the  proceeds  of loans in
the  business  tax  base,  but to allow  a deduction  for  both interest  and the
repayment  of principal.  Such treatment  clearly  has a zero net effect  in
present  value terms  on the  business  tax base.  In the example  described
above,  $800  would  be included  in the  business  tax  base in Year 1, but a
deduction  of $880 (principal  plus interest)  would  be allowed  in Year 2;
these  quantities  are  equal  in present  value  terms  and thus  have no effect
on tax  burdens  or effective  tax rates  on capital  income.  (This  method  of
treating  debt corresponds  to the treatment  of debt under the individual
cash  flow  approach  specified  below.)- 17 -
To summarize,  allowing  debt finance  has no effect  on the  results
presented  in the previous  subsection,  as long as interest  payments  are
treated  correctly. This result  holds for  both the income  and consumption
taxes,  although  the  correct  treatment  of interest  is  different  for  the  two
taxes.  II also holds for both of the two alternative  treatments  of
interest  available  under  the  business  tax  component  of the  consumption  tax.
B.  Consumption  Versus  Iincome  Tax  Treatment  of Individuals
The essential difference between the  income and consumption
taxation of individuals  is the tax treatment  of saving  and the return
thereto  and of borrowing  and interest  expenses. Under an income  tax,  no
deduction  is allowed  for  saving  and  the  annual  return  to saving  is  included
in the  tax  base.  In contrast,  under  what is referred  to as an individual
"cash  flow"  consumption  tax  (hereafter,  an ICF  tax),  a deduction  is  allowed
for saving  placed in so-called  "qualified  accounts"  and withdrawals  from
such accounts,  including  earnings  thereon, are included  in the tax  base.
(Qualified  accounts  can be defined  loosely  as any legitimate  investment
account.) Thus interest,  dividends,  rents,  and capital  gains,  as well as
the original  investment,  are taxed  only when withdrawn  from a qualified
account. Loans  are  also treated  on a cash flow  basis,  as the  proceeds  of
loans  are  included  in  the  tax  base,  but repayment  of interest  and  principal
is deductible. 13
The  "cash flow" terminology follows from the fact that the
individual  tax  base is net cash flow,  defined  as cash receipts  less  cash
saving. The tax  base is consumption  because  wages  and salaries  are taxed
13/  One  well-known  version  of this  type  of tax  is the "cash  flow lifetime
income  tax" proposed  by Aaron  and Galper  (1985);  another  is the cash
flow portion of the consumption  tax plan recommended  by the U.S.
Treasury  (1977).- 18 -
only if consumed,  and capital  earnings  are  taxed  only if  withdrawn  from  a
qualified  account  to finance  consumption. (Note  that the proceeds  of a
loan used to finance consumption  are included in the tax base, while
proceeds that are used to finance an investment  produce an offsetting
deduction  due to the  expensing  of investment,  so that  the loan/investment
combination  has  no immediate  tax  consequences.)
A critical  question  in the  design  of such a tax is whether  gifts
and bequests  are to be treated  as consumption  of t-e donor.  We first
analyze  a model which neglects  gifts and bequests  and then turn to the
question  of the  appropriate  treatment  of  gifts  and  bequests  and  the  effects
of such  treatment.
1.  A  Model  Without  Gifts  and  Beluests
An ICF consumption  tax is sometimes  characterized  as exempting
capital income received  by individuals  from tax, or applying a zero
effective  tax rate to such  capital  income. The rationale  underlying  this
characterization  is analogous  to that  presented  above  in the  discussion  of
a  business  tax which allows  expensing.  Specifically,  if tax rates are
constant  and the  rate  of return  equals  the  discount  rate,  the  tax  benefit
of the  deduction  for  saving  equals  in present  value terms  the tax  cost  of
including  both principal  and interest  in the tax base when savings  are
withdrawn. As a result,  the  effective  tax  rate  on capital  income  is  zero.
These  points can be  illustrated  with the following simple numerical
example.
Consider a two-period  life-cycle  model of individual  behavior
where  consumption  in the  two  periods  is  denoted  as Cl  and  C2;  in this  model
each  of the  two  periods  may  consist  r,f  many  years.  Individual  wage  earnings
in the two periods  are Wl-$4,000  and W2-$2,000.  The interest  rate is
assumed  to  equal  the  discount  rate  and  to  be one;  it is  relatively  large  to
reflect  the  fact  that  the  periods  are  relatively  long  rather  than  a  single
year.  The tax  rate  is  assumed  to  be constant  over  the  individual's  lifetime- 19 -
and equal to 30 percent. 14 In this example, period two values  are
discounted  to  period  one  present-value  equivalents.
If consumption  equals  spending  in  both periods,  the  present  value
of income tax paid (PVT)  would simply  be $1500, since
PVT - 0.3(4000)  + 0.3 (2000)/2  -1500.
In this  case,  the PVT  under  the  income  tax  is equal  to the  product  of the
tax  rate (t)  and  the  present  value  of the  individual's  "lifetime  endowment"
(PVE),  which  is  defined  as the  present  value  of eernings,  or
PVE - 4000 +  2000/2 - 5000,
and
PVT  - t (PVE)  - 0.3 (5000)  - 1500.
A tax in which  the  base equals  the  PVE,  which  can  be referred  to
an endowment tax, provides a convenient  benchmark for the subsequent
analysis.  For the case where  consumption  equals  earnings  in each period
and  the  individual  saves  nothing  in  the  first  period,  the  tax  burdens  under
the  income  and  consumption  taxes  are  the  same;  thus,  the  actual  tax  equals
the endowment tax in present value  terms under both the income and
consumption  taxes.
The differences  between the income and consumption  taxes are
brought out only when the individual  saves during  the first  period  for
consumption  during the second.  Suppose  he wishes to consume  $2,100  in
period one  and save the rest of after-tax earnings for period two
consumption. Under  the income  tax,  saving  in the first  period  (S1)  would
be $700 (700-0.7x4000-  2100).  Period  two  consumption  is thus  the sum of
after-tax  wage earnings in period  two, the amoun~  saved in period  one
(which  is untaxed  in period  two  since  it represents  return  of principal),
14/  The implications  of this  assumption  are  discussed  below.- 20 -
and  the  after-tax  return  on savings,  or
C2 - 0.7(2000)  +  700  +  0.7(700)  - 2590.
Thus,  the  present  value  of taxes  under  the  income  tax  in this  case  is
PVT  - 0.3(4000)  + 0.3(2000+700)/2  - 1605,
which  represents  a 7 percent  tax  increase  relative  to  the  endowment  tax  of
$1,500. The $105  difference  in  present  value  of taxes  paid arises  purely
from  the  taxation  of interest  income  in  period  two (105-0.3x700/2).
Under  the  cash  flow  consumption  tax,  the  individual  again  consumes
$2,100 in the first period, which implies he is able to save $1,000
(Cl-0.7(4000-1000)-2100).  (Note  that S1-$1,000  is deducted  from the tax
base.) Second  period  consumption  is thus
C2  - 0.7(2000)  +0.7(2000)  - 2800,
where  the first  term  reflects  after-tax  wage earnings  and the second  term
reflects consumption  funded from the after-tax  proceeds  of withdrawing
gross savings  of $2,000,  consisting  of $1,000  of principal  and $1,000  of
interest. The  present  value  of ICF  taxes  paid  is
PVT  - 0.3(4000-1000)  +  0.3(2000+2000)/2  - 1500.
This  is again  equal  to the  value  of the  endowment  tax.1 5
15/  However,  note that the equivalence  between  the  present  values  of the
tax  burdens  under a cash flow  consumption  tax and under  an endowment
tax depends on  the assumption of a  constant tax rate over the
individual's  lifetime. Matters  are much less clear  with progressive
marginal  tax  rates. In this  case,  calculation  of the  present  value  of
the endowment tax would presumably require the application  of a
progressive  rate  structure  to a tax  base  equal  to the  present  value  of
each individual's  lifetime  endowment.  Since  consumption  tends to be
relatively  smooth  over time (in  comparison  to the time  path of wage
earnings),  the tax paid under  the cash flow  consumption  tax would  be
likely  to  correspond  fairly  closely  to  that  assessed  under  a tax  on the
present  value  of the  endowment. (In  a steady  state,  this  would  be true
if consumption  were equalized  over the lifetime.) In this  case, the
income  tax  would result  in a tax  burden  higher  than  would  a lifetime
endowment  tax  to the  extent  that (1)  the  return  to savings  were taxed,
and (2) individuals  with variable wage earnings paid higher taxes
because they were subject to relatively  high marginal  tax rates in
high-wage  years.- 21 -
Thus, in contrast  to the income  tax, the cash flow tax has the
effect  of exempting  the yield  from capital  income  from tax.  This occurs
because the value of the tax reduction resulting from the period  one
deduction  for  saving  (300-0.3x1000)  is exactly  equal  in  present  value  terms
to the tax  burden  imposed  by the taxation  of the  withdrawal  of principal
and  interest  in  period  two  (300-0.3x2000/2).  Alternatively,  the  individual
forgoes  $700  of consumption  in  period  one  by saving  $1000  (700-0.7x1000)  in
order  to fund  consumption  of $1400  in  period  two  (1400-0.7x2000).  Because
he realizes  the full 100  percent  return  on his investment,  the return  to
saving  is  said  to  be untaxed.
The  fact  that, under  the appropriate assumptions, the  ICF
effectively  exempts  from  tax  the yield  to capital  income can be
demonstratad  in an even more straightforward  fashion.  Suppose  that the
yield  to capital  income  is  explicitly  excluded  from  the  tax  base;  that  is,
suppose no deduction  is given for saving,  but the return to saving is
untaxed.  The effects  of such an approach  in our two-period  example  are
straightforward.  With no deduction for saving, Sl=0.7(4000)-2100-700.
With no taxation  of capital  income,  C2-0.7(2000)+1400-2800.  The present
value  of taxes  paid is
PVT - 0.3(4000) +  0.3(2000)/2  - 1500,
or the  value  of the  endowment  tax. Thus  consumption  in  both  periods  is the
same  as with the  ICF tax,  and  the  PVT is the  same,  although  the  time  path
of tax  receipts  is different. It is in this  sense  that  an individual  cash
flow tax is equivalent  to a tax which exempts the yield from capital
income.16
16/  Once again, this equivalence  obtains  only with constant  tax rates.
Under  a cash  flow  consumption  tax,  capital  income  is  subsidized  (taxed)
if the tax rate at the time the deduction  is taken  is higher  (lower)
than  the  tax  rate  at the  time  savings  are  withdrawn  and  consumed.- 22 -
This  equivalence  suggests  that  an  alternative  method  of
implementing  a consumption-based  tax at the individual  level  would be to
exclude the yield to capital income from the tax base.  That is, in
contrast  to  the  ICF  approach,  both saving  and  the  receipt  of capital  income
at the  individual  level  would  simply  be ignored  for  tax  purposes. Interest
income, dividends, and capital gains would not be  included in the
individual tax base; symmetrically, interest payments would  not be
deductible. Loans  would  thus  have no tax  consequences.  As a result,  the
individual tax base would consist of only labor income --  wages and
salaries  plus  any  other  labor-related  payments  (including  pension  receipts. 17
Such a  method  of implementing  a consumption-based  tax is  referred  to as an
"individual  tax  prepayment"  plan (hereafter,  ITP). 18
One  well-known  version  of the  ITP  approach  is the  "flat  tax"  plan
proposed  by Hall  and  Rabushka  (1983,  1985). Under  this  approach  all  of the
individual  tax  base, after  personal  exemptions  and a standard  deduction,
would  be taxed  at  a single  tax  rate. A multi-rate  variant  of this  approach
is the so-called  "Plan  X" proposed  by Bradford  (1986).  It can also be
viewed as the  "yield exemption"  portion of the consumption  tax plan
described  by the  U.j. Treasury  (1977). Hereafter,  we limit  consideration
to the  multi-rate  approach;  that  is,  we consider  only  consumption-based  tax
plans  which  provide  for  a progressive  marginal  rate  structure. This seems
appropriate  on vertical  equity  grounds in a developing  country  context;
17/  The treatment  of pensions  and of gifts  and inheritances  is discussed
below.
18/  For  further  discussion  of  why a system  consisting  of an ITP  tax  coupled
with the consumption-based  business  tax described  above is in fact  a
tax  on consumption,  see  Bradford  (1988).- 23 -
moreover,  a flat-rate  tax  would probably  be politically  unacceptable  in
most  countries. In any  case  this  assumption  places  little  restrictions  on
our analysis,  since  everything  said about the multi-rate  approach  which
does  not require  progressive  marginal  rates  also applies  to the  flat-rate
Hall-Rabushka  plan.
In comparison  to the ICF approach,  no deduction  is allowed  for
saving  under  the  ITP  approach,  so that  period  one  taxes  are  larger; on the
other  hand,  no tax  is  assessed  on .he  return  to saving,  so  period  two  taxes
are  smaller. The  tax that  would  be paid  on the  withdrawal  from  savings  of
principal  and interest  under  the  ICF  tax  is  thus  "prepaid"  by virtue  of the
absence  of a deduction  for  saving  under  the  ITP approach. Turning  around
the  argument  made  above,  the  cost  of the  lost  deduction  is equal  in  present
value terms to the benefit  of the exemption  of future  capital  earnings.
(In  anticipation  of the  discussion  in the  following  section,  note that  the
"tax prepayment"  reasoning  applies  regardless  of whether  the funds  saved
are  consumed  or used  to fund  the  making  of gifts  and  bequests.)
To summarize,  an ICF tax differs  from an income  tax in that a
deduction  for  saving  is allowed,  with  all  proceeds  of  dissaving  subject  to
tax.  With constant  tax rates  and  a rate  of return  equal  to the  discount
rate, this is equivalent to exempting capital  income  from tax.  As a
result,  another  way of achieving  a tax  base similar  in  present  value  terms
to that under the ICF consumption  tax is to exempt  capital income  from
taxation  at the individual  level;  this is the ITP  approach  to taxation  on
the  basis  of consumption.
2.  The  Treatment  of  Gifts  and  Bequests
There are two very diverse  views among  consumption  (and income)
tax  advocates  regarding  the  appropziate  tax  treatment  of gifts  and  bequests- 24 -
to other  individuals. 19 Most observers  agree  that  gifts  and inheritances
received  represent  potential  consumption  end thus  should  be included  in a
consumption  tax base of the recipient.  The contentious  issue is the
treatment  of gifts  and  bequests  given.
Under one view, gifts and bequests nade  represent  one form of
consumption  among many alternatives  and thus should  be subject to tax.
This view requires  taxation  of such transfers  to both the donor  and the
recipient. Under the ICF approach,  it implies  that a withdrawal  from a
qualified account to fund the making of a gift or bequest constitutes
consumption  and should  thus  be included  in the tax  base of the donor  (as
well  as the  tax  base  of the  recipient).
Under  the ITP approach,  however,  no tax is due when savings  are
withdrawn  for any purpose, including  the making of gifts and bequests.
(Recall that such treatment is appropriate  since,  relative  to the ICF
approach, the tax has been "prepaid,'  as no deduction  was allowed for
saving.)  Thus, taxation t.)  both the donor and recipient  is achieved
automatically  as long  as gifts  and  bequests  are included  in  the  recipient's
tax  base.  Note that  under  both the  ICF  and ITP  approaches,  this  treatment
can  be summarized  as including  gifts  end inheritances  received  in the  tax
base of the  recipient,  but allowing  no deduction  to the  donor  for  amounts
transferred  through  gifts  and  bequests.
The lifetime  tax  base under  such a plan is equal to all of the
resources  under  the individual's  control,  including  gifts  and inheritances
received,  as well as wages,  salaries  and pensions,  regardless  of whether
19/  The proper  tax treatment  of charitable  donations  is a separate  issue.
Deductions  for  charitable  donations  can  be allowed  under  both the  ICF
and  ITP  consumption  taxes,  as  under  an income  tax,  if suc[L  treatment  is
deemed  to be  a  desirable  and  effective  means  of  stimulating
contributions  to  socially  beneficial  activities.- 25 -
some  of those  resources  are  used to fund.the  making  of gifts  and  bequests.
Thus, this  approach  is consistent  with a "lifetime  endowment"  view of tax
equity,  under  which  an individual's  lifetime  command  over  resources  is  seen
to  be the  proper  basis  for  taxation  of individuals.
The alternative  view is that a consumption  tax should  exclude
gifts  and  bequests  given;  such  transfers  would  be subject  to tax  only  when
actually  consumed  by the  recipient.  Under  both  the  ICF  and  ITP  approaches,
this  view implies  that gifts  and inheritances  received  should  be included
in the tax  base,  but deductions  should  be allowed  for  gifts  and bequests
made. Note that under the ICF approach,  the deduction  for the gift or
bequest  offsets  the inclusion  in the tax  base of the  withdrawal  from the
qualified  account.  In contrast,  under the ITP approach,  deductions  for
gifts and bequests made would offset compensation  and, in many cases,
because  tax  has  been  prepaid,  require  refunds  to the  donor.
Under  this  view,  the  lifetime  tax base  is appropriately
consumption  narrowly  defined,  with  tax  on gifts  and  bequests  paid  only  upon
actual consumption  by the recipient or heir.  Thus, this approach  is
consistent  with a  "dynastic"  view of tax equity, the view that it is
appropriate  for  only a single  tax  to be paid,  when resources  are actually
consumed  by some  member  of a  multi-generational  family.
An alternative  way to approximate  fair  treatment  according  to the
dynastic  view of tax equity  involves  allowing  no deduction  for  gifts  and
bequests  made.  In this case, the tax paid by the donor should  not be
viewed  as a tax  paid on his  consumption,  since  under  the  dynastic  view the
donor theoretically should not pay tax on gifts ane.  beqL3sts given.
Instead,  the tax on the donor should  be viewed  as a proxy tax paid on
behalf of the recipient;  accordingly,  gifts and inheritances  received
should  not be included  in the  recipient's  tax  base.  Note that the  proxy
tax  will be too  high (too  low)  according  to the  dynastic  view if the tax- 26 -
rate  of the  donor  is greater  than  (less  than)  that  of the  recipient.  Under
this  approach,  gifts  and  bequests  are  completely  ignored  in  the  calculation
of the tax base of both the donor and the recipient.  This simple (but
generally  inaccurate)  treatment  contrasts  sharply  with  the  direct  method  of
implementing  the dynastic view described above.  The direct approach
requires inclusion of gifts and inheritances  in the tax base of the
recipient  and deductions  from  the tax  base of the  donor  for all  gifts  and
bequests  made. Such treatment  would clearly  be difficult  to enforce  and
administer.
The choice  between these two views of the proper treatment  of
gifts  and  bequests  depends  on a host  of economic  and  philosophical  issues.
However,  we believe  that developing  countries  considering  consumption  tax
alternatives  should  adopt the lifetime  endowment  viewpoint  and consider
only  alternatives  consistent  with that  viewpoint. This  belief  is  based  on
four  considerations.
First,  the vertical  equity  goals  of any developing  country --  a
fair distribution  of tax  burdens  across  income  classes  --  are likely  to
call for  a tax  burden  across  income  classes  that  is mildly  progressive,  or
at least  not  regressive.  Given  the  common  necessity  of relying  heavily  on
regressive  indirect  taxes  these  goals  can  be achieved  much  more easily  if
the lifetime  endowment  view is  adopted; indeed,  it  may  be very difficult,
as  well  as costly  in  terms  of reduced  ecciomic  incentives  and increased  tax
avoidance  and evasion  due to higher  tax rates  on wealthy  individuals,  to
achieve any particular  vertical equity  goals under a consumption-based
direct  tax  without  adopting  this  viewpoint.  Thus,  we believe  that  adopting
the lifetime  endowment  view of tax  equity  (and taking  steps  necessary  to
enforce  the  tax  provisions  it implies)  is critical  to  ensuring  the  vertical
equity  of a consumption  tax  system  in  a developing  country.- 27 -
Second,  such a system  will arguably  be fairer,  and in any cage,
will certainly  be perceived  as  being  fairer,  than  the  dynastic  alternative
described  above. Most  observers,  in  developing  countries  as  elsewhere,  are
probably  accustomed  to thinking  about  vertical  equity  in terms  of annual
tax  burdens  of individuals. Though  the lifetime  perspective  implicit  in
the  discussion  above  represents  a significant departure from this
convention,  it can plausibly be explained as necessary to achieve
hori?nntal  equity  between  taxpayers  with  equal  lifetime  endowments,  as  well
as vertical  equity.  By comparison,  a multi-generational  or dynastic  view
of equity represents  a much greater  departure  from conventional  views,
since  it effectively  defines  vertical  equity  over  an infinite  time  horizon
for a group of donors and donees (typically  a multi-generation  family
group),  rather than over an individual's  lifetime  or a single  year (or
several  years). Some  prominent  tax  experts  are  unconvinced  that  a lifetime
view of tax equity  is preferable  to a standard  of equity  based on a much
shorter  time  period. 20 In light  of this skepticism,  it seems  unlikely
that  most observers  would  be sympathetic  to a view of equity  based on an
infinite  time horizon.  Accordingly,  the dynastic  view  of equity  would
probably  be unconvincing  as a rationale  underlying  the tax treatment  of
gifts  and  bequests.
In  addition,  allowing  wealthy  heirs  to  consume  tax-free  (under  the
"proxy  tax" alternative  version  of the dynastic  view) would probably  be
perceived as  grossly unfair, even if donors had  been taxed on the
transfers.  (It might be argued  that such perception  problems  are not
significant  since  the income  taxes  in  most developing  countries  generally
tax gifts  and bequests  lightly  without  provoking  public  outcry. However,
contrary  to the  situation  under  the  consumption  tax,  income  from  capital  is
20/  See  Goode  (1980).- 28 -
commonly  subject  to income  tax.  The taxation  of capital  income  under  the
income  tax provides  an indirect  means of taxing  gifts  and  bequests;  that
is, income  taxation  reduces  the return  to wealth  and thus reduces  funds
available for the making of gifts and bequests.  Moreover, in some
developing  countries,  the income  tax is supplemented  by a wealth  tax or a
gift/estate  tax.)  For all of these  reasons,  it seems  unlikely  that the
dynastic  view of tax  equity  could  provide  a rationale  for the  design  of a
tax  structure  that  would  be  widely  acceptable.
Third, the argument,  frequently  made by income  tax proponents,
that  the  accumulation  of  wealth  confers  status,  power,  and  peace  of  mind to
the  owner  and  thus  should  be included  in  measures  of ability  to  pay,  surely
has  some validity, especially in developing countries where wealth
differentials  are  commonly  very great.  This  point supports  the  notion  of
taxing  all individual  wealth  at least  once  during  each  generation.
Fourth,  the existence  of wealth,  estate  and gift taxes in many
countries, as well as a history of progressive income taxes in most
developing  countries,  suggests  that such taxation  conforms  with societal
norms  in  most  countries.
It should  be noted that implementing  a consumption  tax based  on
the lifetime  endowment  view would  not be without  costs.  In particular,
administrative  costs would  be high.  The most important  problems  would
occur  because  it is  notoriously  difficult  to  ensure  that  gifts  and  bequests
received  are  reported  in the  tax  base  of the  recipient;  this  is especially
true for gifts among family members.  It is unclear what types of
administrative  measures  would  be most  effective  in improving  compliance  in
this  area. Monitoring  of such  transfers  would  be simplified  in those  cases
where  the transfers  were recorded  by some  governmental  agency  for  reasons
unrelated  to the national  tax system  (such  as property  transfers  recorded
by local  officials  for  property  tax  or  other  reasons);  alternatively,  rules- 29 -
requiring reporting (either  by  individuals  or by institutions)  of all
transfers  of certain  types  of assets  could  be implemented  in the  hope of
generating  a "paper  trail"  that  would  help identify  gifts  and  bequests. A
separate estate tax could be implemented,  with bequests taxed at the
highest individual  marginal  tax rate under the consumption  tax system;
heirs  could  be allowed  a credit  under  the  consumption  tax  for  taxes  paid  on
their behalf by  the testator.  Note also that the likelihood that
significant  amounts  of gifts  and bequests  will not be reported  under a
consumption  tax based  on  the  lifetime  endowment view  provides  a
justification --  though a  somewhat tenuous one  --  for a separate tax on
individual  net  wealth. Specifically,  such  a tax  may indirectly  offset  the
effects  of undertaxation  of gifts  and bequests  received  by reducing  the
wealth  of the  donors  and  recipients  of such  transfers.  Of course,  all  such
measures  would increase  the  complexity  of a consumption  tax system,  while
still leaving  a significant  portion  of such transfers  untaxed.  In many
developing  countries  it may be best for administrative  reasons  simply  to
omit gifts and bequests  from the tax base.  This would  accord  with the
alternative  view that the lifetime  endowment  model is consistent  with
neither  equity  nor  efficiency.
In addition  to the tax  evasion  problem  of non-reporting  of gifts
and bequest  received,  in  many cases,  problems  in determining  the  value  of
gifts  and bequests  received  would  be significant  even  when such transfers
were reported.  Accurate  valuations  would be particularly  difficult  for
transfers  of ownership  interests  in closely  held  businesses  or for assets
that  are  unique  or infrequently  traded,  such  as art  and  other  collectibles.
Measures  designed  to improve  valuation  techniques  would  add  complexity  and
would  undoubtedly  be somewhat  unproductive  in  the  cases  of  certain  types  of
assets.- 30 -
Another  familiar problem  associated with taxing gifts and
inheritances  arises  in those cases in which the asset transferred  is a
family  business  (such  as a family  farm)  and a portion  of the asset  might
have to be sold  in order  to  pay the  tax  liability. To the extent  this is
perceived  to be a problem,  special  measures  allowing  installment  payments
of taxes  (including  interest  payments  at a market  rate)  could  be provided.
Such  measures  of course  add  complexity  to the  tax  system,  and  are  arguably
inequitable  since  such treatment  would apply  only to certain  elements  of
the  individual  tax  base.
Yet another  cost of adopting  the lifetime  view of tax  equity  is
that individual  decisions  regarding  gifts  and  bequests,  as well as their
nature  (e.g.,  cash  vs. "in  kind"  transfers  such as expensive  educations),
would be distorted.  In addition, taxation  of gifts and bequests  would
generally  involve  taxation  of the return  to saving;  this in turn implies
that  some  of the  intertemporal  neutrality  benefits  of reducing  the  taxation
of capital  income  under  a consumption  tax (to  be discussed  below)  would  be
reduced.
Despite  all  of these  difficulties,  we feel  that  the  arguments  for
the  lifetime  endowment  view  are  compelling,  and  we restrict  our  analysis  to
consumption  taxes that are consistent  with that view.  To improve  the
equity  of a system  of consumption  taxation,  every  effort  should  be made to
administer  and enforce  as effectively  as possible  the treatment  of gifts
and  bequests  implied  by adoption  of the  lifetime  view  of tax  equity. 21
21/  Note,  however,  that these  problems  are not unique  to the consumption
tax.  That is,  very similar  problems  arise  if the  lifetime  endowment
criterion  is adopted  under an income  tax, since gifts and bequests
received should be  included in the tax base, with no offsetting
deduction under  the income tax for donors.  The  only important
difference  is that  deficiencies  in the taxation  of gifts  and  bequests
are offset  in a rather  indirect  fashion  under  the income  tax by the
taxation  of the capital  income  of the donors  and recipients  of such
transfers.- 31 -
Given  the  decision  to restrict  consideration  of consumption  taxes
to those consistent  with the lifetime  endowment  view of equity,  it is
interesting  to  note that  the  above  numerical  analyses  of individual  income
and consumption  taxation  are basically  unchanged  when gifts  and bequests
are considered.  That is, as long as gifts and bequests  received  are
included  in  the  tax  base  and  there  are  no deduccions  for  gifts  and  bequests
given (which  are thus treated  as consumption  of the donor  under the ICF
tax),  the  numerical  comparisons  of the income  and ICF  and ITP  consumption
taxes  are  basically  unchanged.
To see  this,  note  that  gifts  or  bequests  received  would  simply  be
included  in  the  tax  base and  in  the  calculation  of the  present  value  of the
individual's  endowment. In terms  of the  two-period  example  analyzed  above,
gifts  and inheritances  received  could  be included  by separating  Wl into
3,000  of wages and $1,000  of inheritance. Since  no deduction  is allowed
for gifts  and bequests  made,  the division  of C2 into  a consumption  and  a
bequest  component  has  no tax  consequences.  Thus,  all  results  regarding  the
differences  between  income and  consumption  taxes, as well  as the
similarities  between the ICF and ITP approaches,  obtain  when gifts and
bequests  are  treated  as specified  above.
III.  DIRECT  CONSUMPTION  VS.  INCOME  TAXES  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
The  relative  merits  of income  and consumption  as the  basis  for  a
system  of direct  taxation  have been debated  at length  in the literature.
Economists  have generally  focussed  on the  inter-temporal  neutrality  of the
consumption-based  alternative,  compared  with the income  tax, which  favors
present  consumption  and  di criminates  against  (saving for) future
consumption.  Since  our  primary  concern  in this  paper  is  an examination  of
alternative  methods  of direct  consumption  taxation,  our exposition  of the- 32 -
consumption  vs. income  tax debate is limited  to discussing  those major
points  which  are  particularly  relevant  in  a developing  country  context. 22
The analysis  focuses  on issues  which are common  to all forms  of
direct consumption  taxes; the relative  advantages  and disadvantages  of
specific  direct  consumption  tax proposals  are analyzed  in the following
section.  The discussion  considers  in turn issues  of simplicity,  equity,
economic  neutrality  and efficiency,  and consistency  with economic  growth.
We consider  issues  that arise  under the consumption-based  business  tax
proposed  above,  as  well  as those  involving  taxation  of individuals.
A. Simplicity
The  goal  of simplicity  is frequently  invoked  in tax  reform  debates  in
both industrialized  nations and developing  countries,  but it is seldom
attained  in either. 23 Simplicity  is even more important  in developing
countries than in developed  ones, for at least three reasons.  First,
administrative  skills are generally extremel  scarce in developing
countries,  and the  use of such resources  to administer  or comply  with an
unnecessarily  complex tax code is a highly unproductive  use of a very
scarce  and  valuable  asset.  Second,  on average,  the ability  of individuals
and firms  to comply  with a complex  tax  structure  is low;  thus,  complexity
increases  the likelihood  of filing  errors  and, by increasing  the  cost of
compliance  and  administration,  increases  the  attraction  of evasion. Third,
since  evasion  is frequently  endemic,  a simple  tax structure  implies  that
more governmental  resources  can  be devoted  to finding  tax evaders  rather
than regulating  and monitoring  honest taxpayers.  For these reasons,  the
22/  Extensive  discussions  of the  general  consumption  vs. income  debate  are
provided  in  Pechman  (1980).
23/  The recent tax reform effort in the United States  is certainly  an
example  of this  phenomenon.  See  McLure  and  Zodrow  (1987).- 33 -
relative  simplicity  properties  of taxation  on the  basis  of consumption  and
income are of particular  importance  in developing  countries.  Generally,
taxation  on the basis of consumption  rather than income  is superior  on
simplicity  grounds, as can be seen from a discussion  of the following
areas.
1.  Timina  issues
Timing  issues  give  rise to some  of the thorniest  problems  in the
construction  and itmplementation  of an income  tax. 24 The most obvious
problem lies in the measurement  of depreciation  for depreciable  assets.
Although  allowances  for economic  depreciation  are obviously  required  for
accurate measurement  of economic income,  the determination  of economic
depreciation is exceedingly difficult.  The data required to obtain
estimates of economic depreciation  are seldom  available  even in highly
developed  countries,  and  the  few existing  estimates  of  economic
depreciation  are highly controversial.  Such data are virtually non-
existent  in developing  countries. As a result,  rules  for  tax  depreciation
are inevitable  arbitrary  and  generally  result  in taxes  on the income  from
various  types  of depreciable  assets  that are either  too high or too low
from  a theoretical  standpoint. This leads  to investment  distortions  (and
perhaps inequities), as well as attempts to influence depreciation
schedules  through  the exercise  of political  power.  In contrast,  under a
consumption tax, the need for determining economic depreciation is
eliminated,  since  purchases  of depreciable  assets  are  simply  expensed.
The  same  point  applies  to  a  wide  variety  of other  costs  which  must
properly  be capitalized  or amortized  under  an income  tax as advertising,
research, and  the costs of developing natural resources, for which
depletion  allowances  are commonly  provided;  under a consumption  tax all
24/  See  McLure  (1987).- 34 -
these  costs  are simply  expensed  in the year an asset is purchased  or an
expenditure  is made.  The simplicity  of expensing  under the consumption-
based  tax  is  clearly  in  marked  contrast  to the  complexity  of  an income  tax,
where  precisely  accurate  allocation  of costs  is  virtually  impossible,  where
even rough approximations  introduce  considerable  complexity,  and where
inaccuracies  induce  economic  distortions.
Similarly, under a consumption  tax there is no problem with
investments  which  generate  income  over  many  years  and,  under  an income  tax,
raise issues  of when to deem such income  to be realized.  For example,
taxing  income  from  multi-year  production  processes  only  upon  completion  of
a contract allows deferral of  tax liability, and  therefore creates
inequities and distorts economic decisions.  By comparison,  special
"percentage  of completion"  rules for the realization  of income  for tax
purposes  may be preferable  from  the point  of view of income  measurement,
but they add considerable  complexity  to the tax code.  As receipts  are
simply  included  in the  tax base when  received under the proposed
consumption-tax  treatment  of business  receipts  and expenses,  there is no
need to  choose  between  these  unsatisfactory  alternatives.
In addition,  accounting  rules  are  much  simpler  under  a consumption
tax.  Since  all receipts  and expenditures  are dealt  with on a cash flow
basis,  no attempt  need be made to devise  accrual  accounting  rules,  and
avoidance problems related to the manipulation of cash and accrual
accounting  systems  are eliminated. Other issues  which  disappear  under  a
consumption  tax are  special tax rules  for original issue discount
obligations,  expenditures  on goods  placed  in inventory,  indirect  costs  of
self-constructed  assets,  and bad debt reserves  of financial  institutions
and  other  firms. 25
25/  See Bradford (1986) for an extensive discussion  of the simplicity
advantages  of taxation  on the  basis  of consumption  rather  of income.35  -
2.  Capital  Gains
Under  an income  tax, (real)  capital  gains  should  theoretically  be
taxed on an accrual  basis.  Since accrual  taxation  is administratively
impossible  in many instances,  virtually  all income  tax systems  that tax
capital  gains  do so on a realization  basis,  and  frequently  at  preferential
rates. However,  the  taxation  of gains  only  upon  realization  creates  a wide
variety  of tax  avoidance  opportunities  via  deferral  of tax  obligations  and,
together  with the application  of preferential  tax  rates  to capital  gains,
creates obvious  incentives  to recharacterize  ordinary  income  as capital
gain;  both situations  lead to considerable  administrative  complexity  as
tax  authorities  attempt  to  limit  these  avoidance  techniques.
In contrast,  under a consumption  tax, the treatment  of capital
gains  of individuals  is  very straightforward;  under  the  ITP  approach,  gains
are simply  excluded  from the tax  base,  while  under the  ICF approach,  the
taxpayer  has  no  basis  in  assets,  so  all  of the  proceeds  of sales  of capital
assets  are fully  included  in the tax  base  without  preferential  treatment.
(Because  of the expensing  of purchases  of business  assets,  gains  realized
by  businesses are  treated like those of individuals under  the ICF
approach.)  In both cases, administration  and compliance  is greatly
simplified.  In particular,  there is never a need to maintain  records
regarding  the  basis  of  capital  assets  for  purposes  of calculating  gain  upon
sale,  since  the  proceeds  of the  sale  are  either  excluded  or fully  included
in the  base.  In addition,  the  cross-checking  of deductions  for  purchases
of capital assets against proceeds reported as income is relatively
straight-forward,  since  both  are  reported  in  tbe  same  year. By comparison,
if only capital  gains  on assets  are subject  to tax, it is necessary  to
compare  the  basis  reported  by the seller  against  the  proceeds  reported  by
the previous owner in some previous tax period; this is clearly an
administratively  difficult task, especially in developing  countries.- 36 -
Finally,  there  is no need to create a  set of complex rules which
distinguish  between  capital  gains  and  ordinary  income  for  tax  purposes,  and
a wide  variety  cf  tax  avoidance techniques  based  on  the capital
gains/ordinary  income  distinction  are  simply  eliminated.
3.  Inflation  Adjustment
The accurate  measurement  of real economic income requires an
integrated  approach  in  which  balance  sheet  items  are  adjusted  for  inflation
and  these  adjustments are  reflected in income for tax purposes. 26
Alternatively,  a less precise  approach  involving  ad hoc adjustments  to
depreciation, capital gains, inventories, and  interest payments and
receipts  can be employed.  The integrated  approach  involves  complexities
and non-tax issues that most countries  have been unwilling  to accept.
Correct (or even approximately  correct) ad hoc inflation adjustments,
especially  for  interest  payments  and receipts,  are  difficult  to design  and
also inevitably  add complexity  for  both taxpayers  and tax  administrators.
The  degree  of difficulty  can  be gauged  from  the  problems  experienced  by the
U.S. Treasury Department (1984) in designing even a partially  indexed
system,  as well  the  fact  that  all  of the  Treasury  Department  proposals  were
rejected  in the final  version  of tax  reform  enacted  in the  United  States.
In  contrast,  under  a consumption tax, the complexity of  inflation
adjustment  is unnecessary,  since  all quantities  included  in  ie  tax  base
are  simply  measured  in  monetary  values  of the  current  year.
4.  Tax  Arbitrage
The income  tax systems  in most countries,  including  developing
countriAs,  have many features  which  are appropriate  only in a consumption
tax context.  These include  exemptions  for various  forms  of income  from
26/  See  Casanegra  (1984),  Harberger  (1982),  or  McLure,  Mutti,  Thuronyi,  and
Zodrow  (forthcoming).- 37-
capital,  deductions  for certain forms  of saving,  and extremely  generous
provisions  for capital-cost  recovery,  including  accelerated  depreciation
and  first-year  write-offs. Such features  create  opportunities  for  various
forms  of tax  arbitrage,  such  as  borrowing  with  fully  deductible  iziterest  to
invest  in tax-preferred  assets.  This arbitrage,  in turn,  undermines  the
equity and neutrality of the tax system. For political reasons, tax
authorities  generally  are  unable  to eliminate  the inappropriate  provisions
that lie  at the  heart  of the  problem,  and  so respond  (at  best)  with  rules
designed to eliminate or limit such arbitrage,  greatly increasing  the
complexity  of the tax system.  In contrast,  under  a consumption  tax,  all
investments  are  equally  tax-preferred  as long  as  particular  investmenzs  are
not actually  subsidized  through  the tax system.  Thus, the tax arbitrage
problems characteristic of hybrid income/consumption  tax systems are
eliminated.27
5.  Saving  and  Investment  Decisions
The type of special provisions  that create opportunities  for
arbitrage  also distort  investment  decisions  under  an income  tax. To the
extent  that  all investments  are  equally  preferred  under  a consumption  tax,
investment  decisions  can  be made  solely  on the  economic  merits  of project.
rather  than  on the  basis  of differential  tax  treatment. Moreover,  uniform
treatment  of all types  of saving  decisions  removes  the tax treatment  of
alternative  saving  instruments  as a further  complicating  factor  in saving
and  nvestment  decisions  and  as  an area  requiring  administrative  scrutiny.
27/  It is easy to be overly  sanguine  about  this  advantage,  however.  For
example,  deductions  may  be  allowed  for mortgage  interest  on
owner-occupied  housing  under a consumption  tax, even though  no other
interest  expense  is  deductible  and  interest  income  is  exempt.- 38 -
In most developing  countries,  such an environment  would greatly
simplify  and rationalize  saving  and investment  decisions.  Of course,  the
same could be  said of a  comprehensive tax on real economic income.
However,  experience  with income  tax  reform  in  both  developed  and  developing
countries  suggests  that  prospects  for  "levelling  down"  or providing  equally
preferential  treatment of all investment  under a consumption  tax are
probably  greater  than the prospects  of "levelling  up" or eliminating  all
preferential  treatment  of certain  investments  under  an income  tax.
6.  CorRorate  Tax  Integration
One  of the  most  difficult  questions  under  most  income  taxes  is the
integration  of the corporate and individual  income taxes. 28 It is
generally accepted that complete integration,  which requires treating
corporations  like partnerships  for tax purposes, is infeasible.  But
various means  of reducing  double  taxation of  dividends have been
implemented in many countries and proposed in others; these include
imputation  of corporate  taxes  on income  underlying  dividends  to individual
shareholders,  application  of lower  rates to distributed  earnings  than to
retained  earnings,  and  full  and  partial  deductions  for  dividends  paid. All
of these add to complexity,  and none has proved  entirely  satisfactory.
Under a consumption  tax, integration  problems  virtually  disappear,  since
the  marginal  effective  tax  rate  on capital  income  is zero at the  business
level,  and capital  income  is either  ignored  at the individual  level  (the
ITP approach)  or also subject  to a zero  marginal  effective  tax rate (the
ICF  approach). It is  true  that  inframarginal  returns  are  taxed  at the  rate
applied  to business  income,  rather  than at the  marginal  tax rateL  of the
various  owners  of businesses,  but that is generally  thought  not to be a
major reason  for concern.  Most owners  of corporate  shares  in developing
28/  See  McLure  (1979).- 39 -
countries  are  likely  to have income  that  would (or  should)  subject  them  to
the top marginal  rate in any case, and owners  of small businesses  can
generally achieve de facto integration  by paying themselves  deductible
wages  and  salaries.
7.  Extent  of Coverage
One potentially  troublesome  featiure  of consumption  taxes  is that
universal  coverage  of businesses  --  very broadly  defined  --  is general.ly
desirable  to eliminate  possibilities  for tax avoidance.  Attempting  such
broad coverage  is unrealistic  in many instances,  because  it is likely  to
impose large administrative costs for relatively low revenue gains,
especially  in developing  countries,  where a large number of very small
businesses  exist.  Moreover,  it is generally  not feasible  to require  that
every individual  who engages in business transactions,  no matter how
infrequently  or how casually,  should  file a business  tax return. But if
this  is not done  there  may  be opportunities  for avoidance,  for  example,  on
real estate transactions.  However, such problems  also exist under an
income  tax,  and  it is  difficult  to draw  a distinction  between  the  two  taxes
on this  basis.
B.  Eauitv
Perhaps  the  most contentious  issue  in the  consumption  vs. income
tax  debate  concerns  the  relative  merits  of the  two tax  bases  with respect
to the  criterion  of equity  or fairness. There  are  several  aspects  to  both
the  horizontal  equity  (equal  treatment  of  equally  situated  individuals)  and
the  vertical  equity  (progressivity)  aspects  of the  debate.
The most fundamental  question  is whether income  or consumption
represents  the  best  measure  of ability  to  pay for  tax  purposes.  Income  tax
advocates  stress  that the  potential  to  consume  in  any  given  period  (say,  a
year) is a better measure  of ability  to pay than the exercise  of that
potential  in the form of actual  consumption. Consumption  tax proponents- 40  -
society's  resources  (consumption) rather  than what  the  individual
contributes  to the pool (as  measured  by his income).  Strictly  speaking,
the latter  view  argues  for  the type  of consumption  tax  described  above  as
associated  with the  dynastic  view of taxation. Although  we have  precluded
such a dynastic  consumption  tax from consideration,  it seems clear that
those  who find  the  Hobbes  argument  compelling  will  favor  consumption  taxes,
even if of the lifetime  endowment  variety,  over  an income  tax,  while  those
who do  not  will favor  income  taxation.
More critical  to our evaluation  is the  question  of the  extent  to
which the lifetime endowment  view of taxation is relevant for equity
purposes  Suppose  that  tax  rates  and  discount  rates  are  constant  over  time
and that income  and  consumption  tax  bases  are defined  in terms  consistent
with the lifetime  endowment  view (i.  e., gifts  and inheritances  received
included  in the tax  base  with no deduction  for  gifts  and  bequests  given).
If the individual's  lifetime  is indeed  the appropriate  time period for
evaluating  the  equity  of a tax  system,  a consumption-based  tax  of the type
favored here  --  that is, a lifetime income tax --  will be superior to an
annual  income  tax; as demonstrated  previously,  this is true  because,  with
constant tax rates, the present value of the lifetime tax burden is
independent  of the time path of earnings  or of gifts and inheritances
received.  In contrast,  an annual income  tax will assess a larger  tax
burden  on those  who save  more during  the life cycle,  because  they either
earn relatively  early  or consume  relatively  late during  their  lifetimes.
Consumption  tax advocates  argue that the present value of the lifetime
endowment is the appropriate  basis for evaluating  the equity of a  tax
system,  and that the invariant  burden  of the consumption  tax is one its
major  advantages,  while  the  fact  that income  tax  burdens  vary as described
above  implies  that  annual  income  taxation  is inequitable.- 41 -
From  a theoretical  perspective,  the  lifetime  endowment  perspective
has considerable  appeal.  Income tax proponents  frequently  argue that
individuals do not plan their lifetime consumption  decisions in the
meticulous  manner  consistent  with a lifetime  endowment  calculation  and that
capital markets are not perfect, as is assumed in such calculations.
However, it is unclear that such conditions  would necessarily  imply a
preference  for income  over consumption  taxation.  Income  tax proponents
also argue that a relatively  s'aort  time period is more appropriate  for
evaluating  the fairness  of a tax system  than is an individual's  lifetime.
However,  the use of a relatively  short accounting  period  coupled  with a
progressive  rate structure  implies  that tax burdens  will be larger  for
individuals with uneven earnings streams than for those with smooth
earnings  streams. Such  a pattern  of tax  burdens  would  be desirable  only  if
the marginal  utility  of income  is lower during  high-earning  years than
during  low-earning  years;  this  line  of reasoning  does  not  seem  compelling.
Moreover,  the view that a short  time period  is the more appropriate  for
judging  equity is inconsistent  with the widely  accepted  view that income
averaging  is desirable,  where feasible,  in order to  offset  the  effects  of
bunching  of income.
Recall that we have argued that developing  countries should
consider  only  consumption  taxes  consistent  with the  lifetime  endowment  view
of tax equity.  This decision  has major implications  for the vertical
equity  of a consumption  tax system,  since  it implies  that  the  measurement
of individual  ability  to  pay  will include  gifts  and  bequests  received  --  a
component  that is  highly  concentrated  among  the  wealthy. As a result,  to
the extent  such a policy  could  be implemented  effectively,  it would be
easier  to obtain  any particular  vertical  equity  goals  with respect  to the
distribution  of lifetime  income  than if the dynastic  view were adopted.
(As will be discussed  in Section  V, vertical  equity  goals can also be- 42 -
furthercd  by coupling  a  progressive  consumption  tax  with  a  wealth  tax  which
would  affect  only  the  wealthiest  individuals  in  the  economy.)
Several  more minor points  bear on the equity  question.  First,
income taxes in practice  are commonly  replete  with tax preferences  for
capital income that are of little  benefit to the average taxpayer  but
enable  the  wealthy  to lower  their  tax  burdens  dramatically.  As a result,
high-income  individuals  may  actually  bear  a smaller  share  of the  tax  burden
than they  would  under  a progressive  consumption  tax with a comprehensive
base. The  enactment  of  a comprehensive  income  tax  would  eliminate  such  tax
avoidance  opportunities,  but  experience  suggests  that  such  reform  is  often
politically  infeasible.  A comprehensive  consumption  tax  with progressive
rates  may be more effective  in achieving  the  vertical  equity  goals  of a
developing  country  than  a preference-riddled  income  tax,  and  the  political
prospects  for  its  enactment  may  be  more  favorable.
Second,  it is possible  that conspicuous  consumption  is accorded
little  weight  or is even  seen  to be contrary  to the  goals  of a developing
country,  while the accumulation  of wealth  is desirable  to the extent  it
results  in  more  domestic  investment,  employment,  and  growth. Such  a set  of
priorities implies  that  progressive  taxation  based  on consumption,  rather
than  on income,  is  desirable  from  a social  standpoint.
Third, to the extent that the greater incentives  for saving
inherent  in a consumption  tax  result  in a larger  domestic  capital  stock,
wages  should  be higher  and  the  inequality  of income  distribution  should  be
less. Fourth,  political  barriers  to  fairly  progressive  marginal  tax  rates
should  be reduced  if, as under a consumption  tax, such rates  no longer
reduced  marginal  incentives  to save  and invest;  the  end  result  might  be a
more  progressive  rate  structure  than  under  an  income  tax.- 43 -
C.  Economic  Neutrality  and  Economic  Efficiency
In one sense,  economic  neutrality  provides  the same  prescription
for  income  and  consumption  taxes  --  tax  all  elements  of the  base  equally. 29
Nevertheless,  several  important  additional  questions  remain.  The basic
point is that a consumption  tax eliminates  the  distortion  between  current
consumption  and saving  inherent  in an income  tax,  but  probably  at the  cost
of increasing  the  distortion  between  current  leisure  and  work effort. It
is theoretically  unclear  which approach  involves  less costly  tax-induced
distortions  of economic  decisions.  For example,  in a static  two-period
model  with individual  utility  defined  over current  and future  consumption
and leisure,  the  consumption  tax  approach  corresponds  to the  "optimal"  way
of taxing  wage and capital  income  if present  and future  consumption  are
equally  responsive  to changes  in the  net  wage.  In contrast,  if leisure  is
more (less) substitutable  with current consumption  than with future
consumption,  some taxation  (subsidization)  of capital  income  is  optimal. 30
Although  one  could  argue  that  a  consumption  tax  is  optimal  --  or
approximately  optimal --  under a "plausible"  set of assumptions,  such a
conclusion  would  obviously  be a tenuous  one.
Income  and consumption  taxes  also differ  in the extent  to which
they distort individual  decisions  regarding  investment  in human capital
rather  than in non-human  or "physical"  capital.  The simplest  modals  in
this area are characterized  by proportional  taxation,  exogenous labor
supply,  certain  returns  to investment,  and the assumption  that foregone
earnings  are the only cost of producing  human capital;  that is, direct
costs such as tuition  and books are ignored.  In these  models,  both a
29/  Although  the  prescriptions  of optimal  taxation  do not equate  economic
efficiency  with the uniform  taxation  implied  by economic  neutrality,
achieving  efficiency  in practice  is much more likely  under a uniform
tax  system. See  McLure  and  Zodrow  (1987).
30/  See  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980),  Feldstein  (1978),  and  King (1980).- 44  -
consumption-based  tax (of  either  the ITP or the ICF type)  and an income
tax reduce  both the costs (foregone  current  earnings)  and the benefits
(increased  future  earnings)  of investment  in  human  capital  proportionately.
Under the consumption-based tax returns to investments  in human and
physical  capital  are thus treated  equivalently. In contrast,  under an
income  tax, investments  in human capital  effectively  receive  consumption
tax treatment,  but the return to investment  is subject  to tax.  This
taxation  of the return  to physical  capital  results  in overinvestment  in
human  capital. In such  models,  consumption  taxes  are  preferable  to income
taxes on efficiency  grounds;  for example,  in a model  with investment  in
human  and  physical  capital  endogenous,  Driffill  and  Rosen  (1983)  find that
proportional  income  taxes  result  in much higher  excess  burdens  than  equal
yield  proportional  consumption  taxes. 31
These  results  must  be qualified  in  a number  of ways.  For  example,
a  progressive  consumption  tax of the ITP type discourages  investment  in
human  capital  because  future  earnings  are  taxed  at a relatively  high rate;
some taxation  of the return  to physical  capital,  as under a progressive
income  tax,  may  be desirable  to  offset  this  disincentive.  Also,  the  return
to investment  in  human  capital  may  be relatively  riskier  than  the  return  to
investment  in physical capital; again, some taxatis,.a  of the return  to
31/  Driffill  and Rosen (1983)  include  an assumption  of endogenous  labor
supply  without  changing  the  basic  results.- 45 -
physical  capital  may  be desirable  to  offset  under-investment  in  risky  human
capital  by risk-averse  individuals. 32
Thus,  it is difficult to ascertain the relative efficiency
properties  of income  and consumption  taxes  with respect  to the  allocation
of investment  across human and physical capital.  In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the consumption  tax would appear to be more
efficient,  especially  if the range of marginal  tax rates is not great.
Once  again,  such  a  conclusion  is  obviously  a tenuous  one. 33
Another  aspect  of the  efficiency  question  is that  accurate  income
taxation  of many activities  is exceedingly  difficult,  as demonstrated  in
the  discussion  of simplicity  issues  above. In  addition,  different  types  of
saving  are typically  treated  very differently  under  existing  income  taxes
in developing countries.  Accordingly,  non-uniform  taxation  of various
32/  Note that this discussion  assumes  that interest  on student  loans is
deductible  under  the income  tax;  if this  is not the  case, there  is  no
incentive for human capital accumulation  under the income  tax for
individuals  who borrow to finance  their  educations.  Note that the
direct expense of producing  human capital,  such as tuition,  books,
etc.,  in principle  should  be deductible  (or  depreciable)  under  either
an income  or a consumption  tax - to the  extent  that the purchase  of
inputs  into  the  human  capital  production  process  is  not subsidized  and
has no personal  consumption  component. In practice,  such deductions
are generally not allowed due  to the difficulties  of separating
consumption  from  human  capital  investment  expenditures,  as well  as the
presence  of significant  educational  subsidies.  We would  recommend  that
developing  countries  'ollow  this  practice,  using the expenditure  side
of the budget  to offset  any disincentives  to the production  of human
capital;  note  also  that  the  absence  of taxation  of capital  income  under
the consumption  tax would facilitate  saving  to finance  educational
expenditures.
33/  Another  issue  that is important  in Lhe  developing  country  context  is
the  extent  to which  the  tax  system  encourages  emigration  of
highly-skilled  individuals  or "brain  drain." Such  emigration  would  be
encouraged  under  a consumption  tax  to the extent  that  future
consumption  (or  labor  earnings)  would  be subject  to relatively  high  tax
rates  in the  developing  country,  but  discouraged  to the  extent  that  the
return  to  accumulated  wealth  would  be subject  to  income  taxation  in the
foreign  country. The  net  effect  is  unclear  and  would  likely  be swamped
by relative  average  rates  of taxation  and  by non-tax  factors.- 46 -
business  activities  and various  forms  of saving  is likely  to result,  even
under  the  best of  circumstances.  This  in turn  implies  distortion  of saving
and  investment  decisions  and  efficiency  costs. To the  extent  a consumption
tax  avoids  subsidies  to various  industries  (by  taxing  all  marginal  capital
investments  at a zero  marginal  rate  in present  value  terms)  and  treats  all
forms  of saving  identically,  this  source  of economic  inefficiency  would  be
eliminated.
It is likely  that  any income  tax reform  in a developing  country
would leave some sectors, including  owner-occupied  housing and certain
other  industries,  and  perhaps  non-profit  entities  with  business  activities,
with  preferential  tax  treatment. The  result  is that  capital  investment  in
such industries  is not fully  taxed  and  perhaps  even subsidized. In this
case, the desirability  of full taxation  of capital  investment  in other
areas becomes questionable, since it may result in relatively large
investment distortions in favor of the lightly taxed or subsidized
activities. The consumption  tax solution  is to eliminate  such investment
distortions  by offering  "preferential"  or zero marginal  tax treatment  to
all  capital  investment.  This  may  be viewed  as a reasonable  solution  to the
problems  caused  by existing  and immutable  tax preferences  (provided  that
currently  tax-preferred activities do not subsequently become  tax-
subsidized  under  the  consumption  tax).
The above discussion  indicates  that a comprehensive  consumption
tax is a  relatively neutral tax, as it does not distort individual
consumption-saving  decisions or the allocation  of business  investment.
However, it is interesting  to note that such a tax does introduce  one
significant  non-neutrality. As explained  in Section  II, a feature  of a
business  tax  that  allows  expensing  is  that  the  government  becomes  a "silent
partner"  in  private  enterprise,  sharing  in  both the  risk  and  the  return  to- 47 -
private investments  through tax deductions for  -chases  coupled with
taxation  of receipts. Such  treatment  is  likely  to al.er  business  decisions
regarding  risky  investments.  To the  extent  that  the  business  tax  is a flat
rate tax and firms can use losses  to offset other income,  the primary
result of such government  risk-sharing  is likely  to be an increase  in
private  risk-taking. If business  investors  are risk-averse,  such a tax-
induced  increase  in  risk-taking  may  be desirable  from  a social  standpoint. 34
D.  Consistency  With  Economic  Growth
Although  the question  is far from decided,  many consumption  tax
proponents argue that eliminating  the taxation  of capital income  would
result  in significantly  greater  economic  growth. In the  developing  country
context,  this  may occur  for a variety  of reasons. First,  domestic  saving
may increase in response to higher after-tax returns to saving.  The
response  of saving  to  changes  in  the  net  return  is  theoretically  ambiguous. 35
Moreover,  it  would  clearly  vary  across  developing  countries.  Nevertheless,
recent  empirical  research  for the  United  States  suggests  that a positive
response  is  certainly  possible,  and  arguably  the  likely  outcome. 36 To the
extent that increased  domestic  saving  would lead to increased  domestic
investment  (rather  than simply  replacing  foreign-financed  investment),  a
higher  level  of investment  would  be achieved.
Second,  the amount  of domestic  savings  invested  domestically  may
increase. For  example,  suppose  that  domestic  savings  invested  at  home  bear
some  income  tax  burden  in the  developing  country. investors  generally  have
34/  For discussions  of how taxation  can increase  private  risk-taking  and
whether such an increase is socially desirable, see Atkinson and
Stiglitz,  1980.
35/  See  Feldstein,  1978.
36/  See  Boskin  (1978).- 48  -
the option to invest abroad, even when they are subject to exchange
controls. The return  to such investment  is likely  to  be free  of domestic
tax,  either  because  such  returns  are  legally  exempt  from  income  taxation  or
because  any domestic  income  tax is easily  avoided. Moreover,  the foreign
tax  burden  is li'cely  to be light;  for  example,  the  U.S. does  not tax the
capital  gains (other  than  those  on real  estate)  or most interest  receipts
of foreigners, European bearer bonds  provide tax-free interest, and
investment  channelled  through  the tax  haven countries  is largely  free of
tax.  Such a situation  implies  that domestic  investors  face  a strong  tax
incentive  to invest  abroad. Implementation  of a consumption  tax  would  mean
that the tax treatment  of funds  invested  at home would  be as generous  as
that  available  for  investment  abroad. The  elimination  of the  tax  incentive
to investing abroad should  naturally  increase  the fraction  of domestic
saving  invested  in the  developing  country. Again,  total  investment  in the
developing country might  increase as well, although  any increase in
domestically-financed  investment  would be partially  (and perhaps fully)
offset  by a reduction  in  foreign-financed  investment.
The effect  on foreign  investment  in the  developing  country  is  also
obviously  critical.  As discussed  in Section  V below,  decisions  by the
U.S. and other capital-exporting  countries  regarding  the availability  of
tax credits for consumption-based  business taxes paid by their  multi-
nationals would be important in many cases;  no developing  country  can
afford  to levy  heavy taxes  that  cannot  be credited. Of course,  taxes  on
business  income  are  likely  to  be reduced  under  a consumption-based  business
tax  that  allows  expensing  for  foreign-owned  as  well as  domestic  investment.
In this  case,  revenue  loss  to the  developing  country  may  be as impcrtant  a
problem  as the  potential  loss  of creditability.  Also, to the extent  that
taxes  on foreign  investment  are  reduced,  some  additional  foreign  investment- u-9  -
may be expected,  as long  as the tax  reduction  is not absorbed  by reduced
foreign  tax  credits  in  capital-exporting  countries.
IV.  THE  CHOICE  BETWEEN  THE  ICF  AND ITP  APPROACHES
Thus far,  we have argued  that any  direct  consumption  tax adopted
by a developing  country  should  include  a business  tax  that  allows  expensing
and should  be consistent  with the lifetime  endowment  view of tax  equity.
The last  remaining  major  question  --  the  choice  between  the  individual  cash
flow  and tax  prepayment  forms  of consumption  taxes  --  is perhaps  the  most
important  one;  it  should  be  determined  primarily  by  technical
considerations. 37 Although  most observers  tend to think  of consumption
taxes in cash flow terms,  we believe  that the individual  tax prepayment
approach  is the  most appropriate  one in the  developing  world  context. In
this  section,  we explain  our rationale  for  this  decision,  discussing  first
the three  major  differences  between  the ICF  and the  ITP  approaches  --  the
use  of so-called  individual  "qualified  accounts"  in  the  cash  flow  approach,
the treatment  of individual  transitional  problems,  and the treatment  of
gifts  and  bequests  --  and  then  a  wide  variety  of other  issues. 38
37/  Some early consumption  tax proposals  advocated  a mix of ICF and ITP
treatment;  for example,  see U.S. Treasury (1977).  However  such an
approach  presents  formidable  administrative  problems;  in  p-rticular,  it
would  be difficulty  to  police  certain  tax  evasion  techniques  (discussed
below) that take advantage  of the differences  in tax treatment  of
certain  transactions  under  the two approaches. Accordingly,  we limit
consideration  to plans  that  would  allow  only  one  of the  two  approaches
(perhaps  with  exceptions  for  a few  well-defined  types  of transactions).
38/  This  discussion  is  based  largely  on Zodrow  (1987).- 50 -
A.  The  Use  of Individual  Oualified  Accounts
The  most important  difference  between  the  two  types  of consumption
taxes  is that the  ICF tax  allows  individuals  deductions  from the tax  base
for  investments  in so-called  "qualified  accounts"  and  taxes  all  withdrawals
from such accounts. In contrast,  since  an ITP tax treats  all individual
transactions  on a tax  prepayment  basis,  saving  and dissaving  are ignored
for  tax  purposes,  capital  income  is  not taxed  at the  individual  level,  and
no deduction  is  allowed  for  interest  expense.
This results  in dramatic  simplicity  advantages  for the ITP tax.
For example,  all aspects  of loans  are  simply  ignored  in the  calculation  of
the individual  tax undar an ITP tax.  In contrast,  the inclusion  of the
proceeds  of loans  in the  tax  base  as required  under  the  ICF  approach  would
probably  be politically  unpopular,  would  require  an extensive  informational
and educational  campaign,  would result  in considerable  additional  record
keeping  requirements  for all  debt  arrangements,  and  would  create
opportunities  for tax abuses  within families  in the form of loans with
below-market  interest  rates  to lower-bracket  children.
Another  potentially  serious  area  for  abuse  under  a consumption  tax
(as  under  most income  taxes)  is "tax  base  shifting"  to  lower  bracket  family
members.  Such problems  might  be quite serious  under a progressive  cash
flow tax  with individual  qualified  accounts,  as taxpayers  could  establish
such accounts  in the names of their children,  especially  to the extent
gifts to children  were to fall  below  any lifetime  gift/bequest  exclusion
under an ICF tax.  Such  problems  would  not arise  under  an ITP tax, since
all business  income  would  be taxed  at the top marginal  rate,  and tax on
earnings  would  be assessed  on the  earner.  Owners  of closely  held firms
could  inflate  the  earnings  of employed  children,  but this  type  of abuse  is
common  to  all  systems  of  direct  taxation  and  is relatively  easy  to police.- 51 -
Under  the ICF tax, ensuring  that  all interest  income  is included
in the  individual  tax base  would  present the same monitoring and
enforcement  problems  that  plague the income  tax; such problems  disappear
under  the ITP approach since interest income is tax-exempt at the
individual  level.
Note that ITP treatment of interest  would very likely raise
revenue  relative  to income  tax treatment  for two reasons.  First,  even
though  lenders  frequently  avoid tax by not reporting  interest  receipts,
borrowers  are very likely  to report  the associated  interest  deductions.
Second,  borrowers  tend to have  higher  tax  rates  than  lenders,  so that the
revenue  loss due to deductions  for interest  payments  is greater  than the
revenue  gain from  taxing  interest  receipts,  for  a given  amount  of interest
income/expense.  Exempting  interest  income  from tax  would  probably  result
in less  revenue  loss  than the  gain that  would  result  from  the  disallowance
of deductions  for  interest  expense. An important  exception  to this  general
rule involves  interest  on public  debt,  which  is ir.cluded  in taxable  income
under  an income  tax,  with no associated  deductions. Since  such interest
income  would  presumably  be excluded  from  the  ITP tax  base, this aspect  of
the  ITP  tax  would  lose  revenue.
In addition,  withholding  would  be much more  complicated  under  the
ICF  approach. To ensure  timely  payment  of tax,  a system  of withholding  on
loans used  to finance consumption might need to be  introduced.  In
principle,  withholding  on loans  should  occur  at the individual's  marginal
tax rate, although some type of average rate would likely  be used to
simplify administration.  Such a system should theoretically  also be
accompanied  by "negative  withholding"  on  consumption  loan  repayments,  since
such repayments  are deductible  from the ICF tax base.  All of these
complexities  are in marked contrast  to a an ITP tax, where withholding
would generally  be much more accurate  than  under  either  an ICF tax  or an- 52 -
income  tax,  since  returns  to capital  would  be excluded  from  the  individual
tax  base.
In order  to avoid  some  of these  problems,  proporents  of ICF taxes
sometimes recommend that some amount of loans be  treated on a  tax
prepayment  basis;  for  example,  Aaron  and  Galper  (1985)  recommend  that  up to
a total  of $20,000  in outstanding  loans  be granted  such treatment  at the
discretion of the taxpayer.  This would simplify  compliance for many
taxpayers,  although  in principle  records  would still  have to be kept to
determine  whether  the  limit  was exceeded.
However, monitoring costs  under such an approach would be
increased  in two  ways.  First,  tax  administrators  would  have  to ensure  that
repayments  of tax  prepaid  loans  were not illegally  deducted  from the  cash
flow  base.  Second,  the  limit  would  have to be enforced. This  would  seem
to be a difficult  proposition  even in a developed  country,  as it would
require  sigi.ificant cross-checking  capability  across  financial
institutions;  loans  between  individuals  (including  fictitious  or reciprocal
loans intended to take full advantage  of the exemption)  could further
complicate  matters  and  open  avenues  for  evasion. It  would  be significantly
more difficult if not impossible  to implement  such a  scheme in most
developing  countries.
Individuals  who could  avoid the limit  on prepayment-basis  loans
could defer tax liability to a significant  degree by depositing the
proceeds  of such  loans  in qualified  accounts. Moreover,  they  could  reduce
such liability  if they could  use prepayment-basis  loans to take  advantage
of future lower rates.  That is, a taxpayer  could "average"  or smooth
taxable consumption  by borrowing on a tax prepayment  basis to make a
deposit  in a  cash  flow  account  during  a relatively  high-rate  year,  and  then
withdraw  the  proceeds  from  the  qualified  account  to repay  the  loan  during  a
relatively  low-rate  year.  While there  is nothing  inherently  wrong with- 53 -
smoothing  the effects  of progressive  rates, its benefits  should  not be
available  only  on a selective  basis.
Monitoring  systems  would  generally  have to be more comprehensive
under an ICF tax with individual  qualified  accounts  than under the ITP
approach.  The incentive  to avoid  reporting  withdrawals  would  be great,
since the principal amount  withdrawn,  as well as the return,  would be
subject  to tax;  monitoring  systems  would  have to  be sufficient  to insure
reporting  of all  withdrawals  from  all  qualified  accounts.
The use of individual  qualified  accounts  also would result in
additional  opportunities  for evasion  and complexity  in the international
area.  Individuals  with  access  to foreign  borrowing  to finance  deposits  in
qualified  accounts --  like taxpayers  who could avoid the limit  on "tax
prepayment"  loans --  would have significant  opportunities  to defer or
reduce taxes; to the extent this was viewed as undesirable,  complex
restrictions  and monitoring  of such transactions  or perhaps  even  exchange
controls  would  be required.
In addition,  as noted  by Graetz  (1979), the existence of
individual  qualified  accounts  coupled  with the  opportunity  to invest  abroad
on a tax  prepayment  basis (either  legally  or illegally  with little  chance
of apprehension)  would  provide  opportunities  for  tax  avoidance  or evasion.
A  typical scheme would  involve an  investment that consists of two
components,  with  one  made  through  a qualified  account  and  the  other  made  on
a  tax prepaid basis.  The investment  would be structured so that a
disproportionate  share  of the  deductions  would  occur  in  qualified  accounts,
while a disproportionate  share of the income  would accrue in the tax
prepaid account.  Measures taken to combat these avoidance  or evasion
strategies  would add coplexity.  Indeed,  all of the arguments  presented
above  indicate  that the use of qualified  accounts  under the ICF approach54 -
would  result  in  more  complexity  than  the  ITP  method,  although  the  magnitude
of the  additional  complexity  is  difficult  to assess.
Under the  ICF approach  problems  would also  arise  with respect  to
the treatment  of individuals  who migrate.  Since an ITP tax would tax
earnings  on a prepayment  basis and exempt the receipt  of income,  there
would be no problems  of deferral  of tax and subsequent  migration.  In
contrast,  the  cash  flow  approach  would  result  in  opportunities  to avoid  tax
through  emigration. As a result,  transfers  abroad  from  qualified  accounts
would  likely  have  to be treated  as taxable  events. For  example,  Aaron  and
Galper recommend that all qualified  accounts  would have to be held in
institutions  with an established  domestic  residence  and  that  a withholding
tax should  be imposed  at the  maximum  individual  tax  rate  on all transfers
from qualified accounts to individuals  or businesses  with a  foreign
residence.  Such measures  would  obviously  increase  the complexity  of the
ICF  tax.
A final  effect  of using qualified  accounts  should  be mentioned.
To the extent  deductions  for deposits  in qualified  accounts  were taken  at
higher  tax rates  than  those  applied  to subsequent  withdrawals,  an ICF tax
would subsidize  saving  rather  than simply  be neutral  with respect  to the
consumption-saving  decision.  (By  comparison,  the  ITP  tax  would  be neutral.)
As noted  above,  the  efficiency  case  for  such  tax  treatment  is  unclear,  and
neutral  treatment  seems  to  be more likely  to  be optimal  than  policies  that
either  tax  or subsidize  the  return  to  saving. However,  it  is  certainly  not
inconceivable  that  subsidization  of saving  might  be viewed  as desirable  in
a developing  country  in order  to stimulate  saving  and increase  the  rate  of
economic  growth.
B.  Transitional  Issues
Implementation of a consumption tax is generally viewed as
involving particularly  difficult transitional  problems.  These may be- 55 -
especially  troublesome  in  LDCs,  where tax administration  is notoriously
weak.  It is not clear in the context  of most developing  countries  that
these  would  be significantly  more difficult  than  the  transitional  problems
associated  with implementing  an ideal  comprehensive  tax on real economic
income, or even a reasonably  close approximation  to such a tax.  For
example,  in most developing  countries,  a switch  to income  tax rules for
indexing interest  income and expense, taxing indexed capital  gains at
ordinary interest rates, and eliminating all  saving and investment
incentives  would  involve  significant  transitional  problems. Nevertheless,
the resolution  of transitional  problems  is critical  to the implementation
of any  consumption  tax.
In principle,  transitional  issues  are important  if the  magnitudes
of the  net changes  in individual  wealth  induced  by implementing  reform  are
sufficiently  large. These  changes  must reflect  all  effects  of reform  and
all special  transitional  provisions. Nevertheless,  it is convenient  to
Isolate  several  effects  of implementing  a consumption  tax  and discuss  the
reform-induced  gains  and losses  caused  by each; this  approach  is followed
in the  discussion  below.  Since  we have assumed  that  both the  ICF  and ITP
taxes would  include a consumption-based  business tax, their business
transitional  issues  are the  same;  these  are discussed  in Section  V.  The
following  considers  the  differences  in the individual  transitional  issues
associated  with implementing  the  two  consumption  tax  plans.
The  transitional  issue  that  has received  the  most  attention  is the
treatment of individual  savings excant at the time of enactment  of a
personal  consumption  tax. Two types  of difficulties  arise,  which  have  been
termed  "price  change"  and "carryover"  problems. 39
Price  change  problems  are  unexpected  changes  in  wealth  that  result
from  changes  in  the  relative  prices  of assets  induced  by changes  in the  tax
39/  See  U.S.  Department  of the  Treasury  (1977).- 56 -
structure;  these  occur  because  of reform-induced  changes  in future  after-
tax returns.  For example,  unless  all factors  are perfectly  mobile,  the
elimination  of favorable  tax  treatment  for  a business  activity  will lower
after-tax returns  to immobile  assets  employed  in the activity  and thus
lower their  values.  Such price  change  problems  would  be broadly  similar
for  both plans,  and indeed  for any reform  including  a movement  toward  a
comprehensive  income  tax.  They presumably  would be mitigated  with the
standard  sorts  of  delay, phase-in,  grandfathering or compensation
provisions,  are  quite  similar  for  both ITP  and  ICF  taxes,  and are  therefore
not  discussed  further  here.
Carryover  problems  arise  in two  forms. The  first  occurs  when new
tax  rules  imply  that  income  earned  under  the  old  tax  regime  but  untaxed  due
to deferral provisions  will escape taxation  under the new regime; for
example,  a switch  from  a realization-based  income  tax to an ITP  tax  would
imply  that capital  gains accrued  but untaxed  under the income  tax would
escape tax entirely.  The second  form of carryover  problem  occurs  when
income  which  was fully taxed  under the old system  will be subject  to a
second  tax  under  the  new system;  for  example,  adoption  of rule  that  deemed
all existing  financial  assets  to  be held in qualified  accounts  at the time
of a  switch from an income tax to an ICF tax would result  in double
taxation  of those  assets  that  were subject  to tax  under the  prior income
tax regime. 40 Such problems  are frequently  cited as one of the most
disturbing  features  of  switching  to a  consumption  tax.
40/  Note  that there would be no carryover problem for assets that
effectively  received  ICF treatment  under the pre-reform  income  tax.
For examnle,  such assets  would include  those in ICF-type  retirement
accounts (those  for which the taxpayer  received a deduction from
current income  for deposits  made into the account)  and pension fund
assets  in those  cases  in  which  contributions  to  the  fund  were  untaxed.- 57 -
The two  types  of plans  appear  to face  very  different  transitional
problems of the carryover type.  Under the ICF approach,  any.  existing
assets  that  would  be newly  classified  at the  time  of enactment  as qualified
account assets would  face double taxation to the extent  they were
accumulated  out  of after-tax  income. Accordingly,  Aaron  and  Galper  propose
the following  set of transition  rules  designed  to mitigate  the  effects  of
such  double  taxation. The  proceeds  of all  sales  of "old"  assets  --  those
extant  in the year of enactment  of the ICF consumption  tax --  would be
fully included in the ICF tax base; however, taxpayers  would get a
deduction  related  to the remaining  tax  basis  of the  asset  in the  year of
enactment. 41 Old assets  sold  in the  year of enactment  would  simply  get  a
deduction  for remaining  basis.  Old assets  sold  subsequent  to the  year of
enactment  would  get  a  deductipn  equal  to the  basis  remaining  in  the  year  of
enactment, indexed  by a factor  equal  to  one  plus  a market-related  nominal
interest  rate  each  year.  Thus,  the  deduction  for  basis  would  in all  cases
be equal in present  value terms to the basis remaining  in the year of
enactment  of reform.  This treatment  of existing  assets  would  be coupled
with immediate disallowance  of all interest  deductions  on all existing
loans.
These  transitional  rules  would  have the  effect  of providing  "old"
assets  and loans  with consumption  tax treatment  in the  year of enactment.
Old assets  would effectively  be accorded  ICF treatment. That is,  assets
sold  in the  year  of enactment  would  receive  expensing  of remaining  basis  in
that  year,  while  assets  sold in years  subsequent  to the  year of enactment
41/  For example,  for a depreciable  asset,  the remaining  tax basis would
equal  the  portion  of the  cost of the  asset  that  had not  been deducted
under  the  income  tax  at the  time  of enactment  of the  consumption  tax.- 58 -
of reform  would receive  the same treatment  in present  value terms.  The
proceeds of all asset sales would be fully included  in the tax base.
Simultaneously,  old loans would be accorded ITP treatment.  That is,
repayments  of interest  and principal  would not be deductible,  and also
would  not  be included  in the tax  base of the lender. As demonstrated  in
Section  II, ICF and ITP treatment  are roughly  equivalent,  and both are
consistent with a  consumption tax.  As a result, the Aaron-Galper
transition  rules  would  provide  old assets  and loans  with consumption  tax
treatment at the time of enactment and thus avoid incentives  for the
churning  of assets  after  a  switch  to  a consumption  tax.
The effects  on holders  of existing  assets  of such an immediate
application  of consumption tax rules would  depend on  the relative
magnitudes  of remaining  basis  and  outstanding  principal  of debt.  Owners  of
existing assets would gain (be indifferent,  lose) to the extent that
remaining basis was greater than  (equal to, less than) outstanding
principal  of debt.  Such treatment  would be quite  generous  to investors
whose assets  were primarily  equity  financed,  since  they  would immediately
receive  the  benefits  of expensing  of the  remaining  basis  for all  existing
assets,  without  losing  much from the loss  of interest  deductibility. On
the other hand, it would be quite  harsh to investors  whose assets  were
debt-financed  but had little  or no remaining  basis.  To such investors,
expensing  of basis  would be of little  benefit,  but the loss of interest
deductibility  would be a  large cost, since the investor  would not be
allowed  the  interest  deductions  expected  when  debt  was  incurred;  of course,
no deduction  would  be allowed  for  repayment  if interest  or  principal  under
the  ICF  tax.- 59 -
In addition,  under  the  Aaron-Galper  transition  rule,  indexing  the
deduction  for  basis  from  the  time  of enactment  using  nominal  interest  rate
would  add  some  complexity,  and  the  choice  of the  interest  rate  might  prove
controversial.  Moreover, rules to reduce the revenue loss due to
deductions  of basis  of existing  assets  would  add to the  complexity  of the
system.
Under  an ITP  tax,  the  carryover  problem  is the  need to tax  income
accrued  but untaxed  under  the  income  tax,  such  as unrealized  capital  gains.
One approach,  recommended  by Hall and Rabushka,  is to provide  no special
treatment, that is, to exempt such accrued  pre-reform  gains.  Unless
capital  gains  were  effectively  taxed  at zero  or relatively  low  rates  under
the  pre-reform  system,  this  would result  in a windfall  gain since  accrued
but  unrealized  gains  would  permanently  escape  tax. Given  the  difficulty  of
effectively taxing capital gains in developing countries,  even where
required  by law,  this  may  not  be a major  problem.
An alternative  would  be to  require  gains  on pre-existing  assets  to
be included  in the ITP tax base on a cash flow basis as a transitional
measure,  calculating  the  amount  to be included  using  an approach  identical
or similar  to that  proposed  by Aaron  and  Galper. Viewed  in this  way, the
transitional  problems (and perhaps  the solutions)  under the two reform
plans are quite similar.  Note that Aaron-Calper  type rules would be
somewhat  simpler  under  an ITP  tax, since  the  revenue  loss  associated  with
granting  immediate  deduction  of  basis  would  be significantly  smaller  since
reinvestment  of funds  would  not  reduce  current  tax  liability.
C.  The  Tax  Treatment  of Cifts  and  Bequests
As stressed  above,  we believe that developing  countries  should
consider only consumption  tax proposals consistent  with the lifetime
endowment  interpretation  of tax  equity. As  described  in  Section  II,  this
criterion  implies  somewhat different  treatment  of gifts  and  bequests  made- 60 -
under the  ITP  and ICF  consumption  taxes.  But  as demonstrated  there,  the
two  treatments  are  in fact  roughly  equivalent.  However,  to the  extent  the
taxation  of gifts and bequests to both donor and recipient generates
political  opposition,  questions  of perception  may favor the  ITP approach.
This point is valid only if the double taxation  of gifts and bequests
implied by the lifetime endowment  view is less obvious under the ITP
approach. This may be true,  since  the  gift or bequest  is simultaneously
included  in the tax base of the donor and the recipient  at the time of
transfer  under  the  ICF  tax;  in  contrast,  only  the  recipient  pays  tax  at the
time of transfer  under the ITP approach,  since all forms  of consumption
funded  by saving,  including  the making  of gifts and bequests,  are "tax
prepaid".  As a result, there might be  less sentiment for generous
exclusions  for gifts and inheritances  received  under the ITP approach.
(Note that Aaron and Galper recommend  a $200,000  lifetime  gift/bequest
exclusion  under  their  version  of the  ICF  tax.)
D.  Additional  Issues
1.  Opportunities  vs.  Outcomes
An interesting  equity  issue  raised  by the two plans is whether
fairness  across  individuals  should  be  judged  on  the  basis  of
"opportunities"  or "ex  ante equity"  or on the  basis  of "outcomes"  or "ex
post equity.  "  The  opportunities  notion of  fairness implies that
individuals  who face the same investment  opportunities  (have  the same
wealth and same portfolio choices) should face the same tax burden
regardless  of the outcomes  of their investment  decisions;  this view of
fairness has been attributed to the ITP approach.  In contrast, the
outcomes  notion  of fairness  implies  that  the  actual  outcomes  of investment
decisions  are  critical  and  should  form  the  basis  of taxation;  this  view  has
been attributed  to the  ICF  approach  and  is sometimes  phrased  as the  notion
that  "winners"  should  pay  higher  taxes  than  "losers."- 61 -
Early  discussions  suggested  that  this  difference  was critical  and
that a system based on opportunities  was likely to be perceived as
fundamentally  unfair. 42 More  recently,  this  difference  has  been shown  to
be more apparent  than  real in  many important  cases;  in  particular,  as long
as investments  can be replicated,  tax rates are constant across time
periods,  and  the government  can invest  tax  proceeds  (which  are  received  at
an earlier  point  in time  under  the  tax  prepayment  approach)  at the  average
rate of return in the economy,  both investor returns and government
receipts  are  the  same  under  the  two  approaches.
A  simple  example  will  illustrate  this  point. Consider  an investor
in a 30 percent  tax  bracket  who earns  and invests  $1,000. The investment
has a 0.2 probability  of a five-fold return  and a 0.8 probability  of
becoming  worthless  after  one "period";  the  average  or expected  gross  rate
of return in the economy,  which is assumed to equal the government's
discount  rate,  is thus 0.2 (0.2  x 5 +  0.8 x (-4)  - 0.2).  Under  the ITP
approach  (the  "opportunities"  approach  where  tax  is prepaid),  the  investor
pays tax  of $300 in the  first  period,  iuivests  the  remaining  $700,  and  has
period  two  consumption  of either  $4,200  (6  x 700)  or zero,  depending  on the
outcome  of the investment. Under the ICF (the "outcomes"  approach),  the
investor  invests  the  full  $1,000,  but  must  pay tax  at a rate  of 70  percent
on any returns.  Depending  on the  outcome,  the investor  again  has period
two  consumption  of either  $4,200  (6  x 1000  x 0.7)  or zero,  but  pays tax  in
period two of either $1,800 (6 x  1000 x 0.3) or zero.  Consumption
possibilities  are  clearly  the  same  under  either  approach  for  both "winners"
and "losers."  Moreover, as long as the government  can invest  at the
average  rate  of return  in the  economy,  the  expected  value  of tax revenues
42/ See  Graetz  (1979)  and  U.S.  Treasury  (1977).- 62 -
in period  two  dollars  is $360 in both cases (300  x.2 for the ITP tax  and
0.2  x 1800  +  0 for  the  ICF  tax).
This argument is not entirely convincing, since it must be
qualified  in several  important  ways.  First,  situations  in  which  investment
opportunities  can not be replicated,  such as unique  market  opportunities
identified  by a single  entrepreneur,  are by no means trivial;  presumably
these  are  precisely  the  types  of situations  that  underlie  concern  with  this
issue. Second,  the  government  may  be unwilling  or unable  to invest  at the
average  gross  rate of return  in the  economy,  so that the  present  value  as
well as thei  time path of revenues  would be different under the two
approaches.  Third, government  revenues  and private  consumption  may be
larger  under  the  ICF  approach  if  individuals  are  risk  averse  and  government
risk-sharing  encourages  individual  risk-taking.  In this case the tax-
induced increase  in individual  risk-taking  yields positive returns  on
average.
Finaliy,  the  perception  problems  associated  with the  tax  repayment
approach,  especially  within  the context  of a tax system  with progressive
marginal  rates,  could  be significant. Application  of the opportunities
approach  would  probably  conflict  with  commonly  perceived  notions  of equity,
especially in developing  countries,  where there is relatively little
economic sophistication.  Such problems could arise for two reasons.
First, some observers might feel that the above qualifications are
sufficiently  important  that the equivalence  result is of little  policy
significance. Second,  and more likely,  is that  most people  would  either
not understand  or not  be aware  of the  result,  but  would  certainly  be aware
of the  intuitively  appealing  notion  that  "winners"  should  pay  more  tax  than
"losers."  On the other hand, the least sophisticated citizens of
developing  countries  probably  pay little  attention  to such issues  in any
event.- 63 -
Nevertheless, these results suggest that, from an economic
perspective,  the difference between the opportunities and outcomes
approaches  is substantially  smaller  than commonly believed.  The
distinctions  that  are  real  are  probably  not  of sufficient  importance  to  be
a deciding  factor  in the  choice  between  the  ITP and ICF  approaches,  since
most  highly  successful  investments,  such  as  venture  capital  success  stories
and highly  productive  investments  in natural  resources,  would in fact  be
taxed on an "outcomes"  basis under a pro?erly  structured  business tax.
Finally,  if certain  types  of outcomes  are perceived  as being  appropriate
for  taxation  at the  individual  level,  this  could  be accommodated  within  the
ITP framework;  for example,  prizes,  awards,  and lottery  winnings  could  be
included  in the  individual  tax  base,  even  though  they  are  not  labor  income.
2.  Income  Averaging
Explicit averaging  generally should not be considered in the
developing  country  context,  since it introduces  many problems,  including
complexity,  administrative  difficulties  in coping with changes in the
taxpaying  unit due to marriage,  divorce  and death,  and the difficulties
associated  with  monitoring  of multi-year  records.
The  ICF  tax  would  provide  more  opportunities  than  the  ITP  approach
for  implicit  averaging,  since  the  timing  of taxation  would  be determined  by
consumption  rather  than earnings  patterns;  as argued  in Section  II, such
averaging  is desirable  on equity  grounds  from  a lifetime  perspective. To
the extent  the  tax structure provides  for relatively narrow rate
differences,  this  problem  would  be reduced  in importance. Moreover,  the
re ommended  treatment for pensions provides an effective averaging
mechanism, if only for the typically small portion of the tax-paying
population  in  a  developing  country  that  participates  in  pension  plans.
Finally,  some  critics  of the  ICF  consumption  tax  argue  that  it is,
or would  be perceived  to be,  unfair  because  it imposes  relatively  high  tax- 64 -
burdens  during  the  high-debt  period  of youth  and the  high-dissaving  period
of old  age.  This  problem  does  not  arise  under  the  ITP  approach,  since  tax
burdens track  wages.  Any problems  of the ICF tax in this area could  be
mitigated  by the provision  discussed  above that would allow some fixed
amount  of loans  to  be treated  on a tax  prepayment  basis;  similar  provisions
could  be made  for  housing  purchases.
3.  Housing  and  Other  Consumer  Durables
Apart from any subsidies (which  could be applied  under either
approach),  the tax treatment  of owner-occupied  housing  would be similar
under the two types of consumption  taxes.  It would be extraordinarily
difficult,  from both an administrative  and a political  standpoint,  to
impute  the  returns  to investment  in  owner-occupied  housing  and  include  them
in an individual  cash  flow  base;  as a result,  both ITP  and  ICF  plans  would
almost  certainly treat  housing on  a  tax-prepaid basis.  That  is,
investments  in owner-occupied  housing would not be deductible,  and no
attempt  would  be made to impute  rent  to the  owner. The  primary  difference
is that  down  payments  withdrawn  from  a qualified  account  would  result  in a
bulge  in taY  base  under  an ICF-based  tax. One  solution  to this  problem,  if
it were thought  significant,  would be to allow something  like ten-year
averaging  for down payments  for owner-occupied  housing withdrawn  from a
qualified  account:  this  would  add  some  complexity  to the  system.
Consumer durables and collectibles presumably would also be
treated  on  a tax  prepayment  basis  under  both  plans. In  principle,  if  there
were concern  about large and untaxed  gains  on such items,  one solution
would be a special  tax on capital  gains  on collectibles  (and  even 3wner-
occupied  housing)  after  an adjustment  for inflation;  in fact, such  a tax
would  be administratively  infeasible  because  of the difficulty  of taxing
such  gains.  (Such  a tax  would  be complex,  especially  since  basis  would  be
indexed.)  Moreover,  one can argue that such a tax is unnecessary  as a- 65 -
matter  of  principle;  the  tax  on the  return  to  investment,  which  is  composed
partly  of  consumption  benefits  and  partly  of appreciation,  has  been  prepaid
(since  no deductions  for the investment  was allowed).  In theory,  then,
such a capital  gains  tax should  be designed  to capture  only  extraordinary
gains.  This implies  that, for purposes  of computing  the extraordinary
gain,  the  basis  should  be increased  by a factor  based  on a nominal  rate  of
return  (after  some  allowance  for  consumption  benefits)  rather  than  just  the
inflation  rate.  Such  fine-tuning  would  add further  to the  difficulties  of
administering  such  a tax.
4.  The  Taxation  of Non-Wage  Returns  to Entregreneurship
An ICF  consumption  tax  couples  a consumption-based  business  tax  at
the  business  level  with cash flow  treatment  at the  individual  level.  Such
an approach results in the double taxation of non-wage returns to
entrepreneurship. This occurs because when an individual  contributes
entrepreneurial  skills  to  a start-up  venture  neither  the  individual  nor  the
firm gets a deduction for this risky "investment."  Suppose that the
venture  is successful  and the individual  receives  payment  in the form of
stock  in  the  company.  The  result  is that  the  returns  to  this
entrepreneurship  are taxed first  at the company  level,  since there  is no
deduction  for  the "investment",  and then  at the  individual  level  eithe;  as
capital gains or as dividends.  (Contracts that provided for larg_
(deductible)  wage payments  contingent  upon the success  of new ventures
could  provide  a partially  satisfactory  means  of  dealing  with  this  problem.)
This problem  does  not arise  under  an ITP tax,  since  dividends  and  capital
gains  are  not taxed  At the  individual  level.
The double  taxation  of non-wage  returns  to entrepreneurship  under
a ICF  tax  would  have  several  important  and  potentially  undesirable  effects.
To the extent  such returns  represent  pure economic  profits,  double  taxing
them would be efficient  (although  arguably  inequitable)  and would allow- 66 -
lower rates of tax on other activities  where taxes are distortionary.
However,  to the  extent  such  payments  represent  returns  to risk-taking,  a
disincentive  to risk-taking  may arise,  especially  in the presence  of a
progressive  rate structure and limitations  on loss offsets  and carry-
forwards. Such  a result  would  be inconsistent  with  the  goal  of encouraging
economic growth in developing countries.  Finally, from a political
perspective,  double  taxation  of the  returns  to entrepreneurship  would  seem
to be an undesirable proposition.  On balance, the absence of double
taxation  of the  returns  to  entrepreneurship  under  the  ITP  tax  seems  to  be a
distinct  advantage.
5.  Treatment  of Loans  at the  Business  Level
As described  in Section  II, loans  at the business  level  can be
treated  in one of two ways under a consumption-based  business  tax. (As
noted there,  these  correspond  to the  differing  treatments  of loans  under
the ICF and ITP approaches.) The simplest  treatment  is simply  to ignore
them;  interest  receipts  would  not  be included  in  the  business  tax  base,  and
interest  payments  would  not  be deductible.  This  approach  has the  distinct
advantage  of treating  debt  and interest  in exactly  the same  way as equity
and dividends. An alternative  approach  is to treat  loans  on a cash flow
basis,  with proceeds  included  in the base and repayment  of interest  and
principal  deducLible. Thus loan proceeds,  but not equity  contributions,
would  be included  in the  business  tax  base,  and  deductions  would  be allowed
for interest  paid and principal  repayments  but not for dividends  or the
return  of  equity.
The former  would seem to be the preferable  approach,  both on
simplicity  grounds  and  because  any  administrative  and  enforcement  problems
regarding  relabelling  of dividends  as  interest  (in order  to get
deductibility  at the  business  level)  would  be avoided.- 67 -
6.  Defining  Activities  Subject  to Business  Taxation
It would  be highly  desirable  for any consumption  tax plan to be
structured  in such a way as to prevent  abuses  which involve  "gaming  the
system"  by assigning  deductions  and/or  losses  to cash flow accounts  while
receiving tax prepayment treatment (i.e.,  exclusion)  for income  and/or
gains.43 This  problem arises only under  the combination of the
consumption-based  business  tax  and  the  ITP  tax,  where  business  receipts  and
purchases  are  included in the tax base  on a  cash flow basis, but
individuals  receive tax prepayment  treatment.  Accordingly,  under an ITP
tax, the definition  of businesses,  which are required  to use cash flow
treatment  for receipts  and purchases,  would  have to be quite  broad (e.g.,
including speculative land purchases and the ownership of rights to
royalties)  in order  to  prevent  opportunities  for  such  schemes.  Determining
which activities  would require  the filing  of a business  return  would  be
difficult and would  inevitably require some arbitrary distinctions;
administering  such  rules  would  also  be difficult.
Note  that  a  de minimis  rule  exempting  small  businesses  from  filing
returns  generally  would  be desirable  on simplicity  grounds. 44 However,
such  a rule  would  open  avenues  for  abuse  of the  type  described  above,  since
"small"  firms  qualifying  for  the  tax  exemption  would  effectively  be treated
on  a  tax  prepayment  basis.  Finally,  note  also  that monitoring
international  transactions  to insure  that  similar  techniques  were not  used
to  avoid  or evade  taxation  would  be difficult  under  both  plans.
43/  See  Graetz  (1979).
44/  In  many  developing  countries,  such  a rule  would  imply  that  only  "modern
sector"  firms  would  be subject  to the  business  tax.- 68 -
E.  Summary
In our view,  the above  discussion  presents  a compelling  argument
in support  of the ITP approach  as the preferred  method  of structuring  a
direct consumption-based tax in a developing country.  Its primary
advantage  over the ICF approach  is that it is much simpler  in terms  of
compliance,  monitoring,  and  administration. In addition,  structuring  the
tax  to be consistent  with the  lifetime  endowment  view of tax equity  would
be marginally  easier,  while  transitional  problems  would  be broadly  similar
under the two approaches. All of the remaining  points  considered  above
either favor the ITP approach, or are not sufficiently  important to
outweigh  its  simplicity  advantages.  Accordingly, we believe that
developing  countries considering  a direct  form of consumption  taxation
should  seriously  consider  only  the  ITP  approach.
V.  THE  DESIGN  OF AN ITP  CONSUMPTION  TAX  IN  A DEVELOPING  COUNTRY
In  this  section,  we  provide  additional  details  on  the
implementation  of an ITP  consumption  tax  in  a developing  country.  We focus
on structural  issues,  including  details  of the  business  tax,  as well  as on
international  and transitional  issues. We also consider  the advisability
of both a  supplementary tax on individual  wealth and taxation on a
presumptive  basis  within  the  context  of an ITP  consumption  tax.
A.  Details  of the  Business  Tax
As described  in Section  II, the consumption-based  business tax
under the ITP plan is basically  a straightforward  tax on gross receipts
less deductions  for  business-related  expenditures,  including  purchases  of
equipment  and structures  and additions  to inventories;  no deductions  are- 69 -
allowed  for  dividends  or interest  paid.  Nevertheless,  a number  of issues
must  be resolved  in  designing  the  business  tax  component  of the  ITP  plan.
1.  Limits  on  Wages  Paid  and  the  Use  of Stock  Ogtions
Under  an ITP tax,  there  need be no limits  on wages and salaries
that can be paid out by a business  to owners  or employees,  except  for
excessive  wages and salaries  paid to children,  spouses  and relatives  in
order  to avoid  higher  marginal  tax  rates. Thus,  business  income,  which  is
all subject  to the  maximum  individual  tax  rate,  can  be converted  into  wage
income  of the  owner,  which  is  subject  to  a  progressive  rate  schedule. Such
payments  are all  subject  to tax  at the individual  level. This,  in effect,
allows  "do-it-yourself"  integration  for  owners  of small  businesses.
Note also  that  the  use  of stock  options  as a form  of compensation
does not present problems  under an ITP tax.  In the typical  case, an
individual  contributes  entrepreneurial  or managerial skills to an
enterprise  and  receives  options  on the  stock  of the  company  rather  than  (or
in addition  to) salary. Since  neither  the firm  nor the individual  gets a
deduction  for  this "investment,"  all  returns  are  fully  taxed  at the firm
level  (at  the  maximum  individual  rate). 45 Thus,  no additional  tax  need  be
assessed  when the individual  exercises  the stock  options;  the individual
has  effectively  made  a tax-prepaid  investment  in  the  firm. 46
45/  There  seems  to  be no reason  to  allow  the  firm  a deduction  for  the  value
of the stock option and simultaneously  include  this amount  in the
compensation  of tbe individual. Such an approach  would  have little
revenue  effect  in most cases  (since  the  firm deduction  and individual
inclusion  would  cancel  out in the absence  of rate  differentials)  and
imputing  a value to the stock  option  would  be very difficult  in most
cases.
46/  See  the  discussion  of  the  taxation  of non-wage  returns  to
entrepreneurship  in Section  IV.D.4.- 70 -
2.  Sales  of Fixed  Assets
The  taxable gross receipts of a business include all sales,
including those of fixed assets.  Such treatment is consistent  with
expensing  of such assets  under a consumption-based  business  tax, and is
essential  to  prevent  tax-motivated  churning  of assets. Monitoring  of sales
of used fixed  assets  would  be critical  to effective  tax  administration  to
prevent tax abuses. Indeed, it might be desirable for cross-checking
purposes  to require  purchasers  of used fixed  assets  to provide  taxpayer
identification  information  on the  seller  when claiming  deductions  for  used
equipment  purchases.  (For  administrative  reasons  it  might  be desirable  to
require reporting only for large individual purchases or for large
aggregate purchases during the year.  One could also argue that the
benefits  of expensing  are  sufficiently  great  that  all  sales  of fixed  assets
should  be subject  to such rules;  however,  administrative  considerations
would  probably  preclude  such  treatment.)  The  transitional  problems  caused
by the inclusion  in the business  tax base of sales of fixed  assets  are
discussed  below.
3.  Treatment  of  Losses
The  expensing  of purchases  of equipment,  structures  and additions
to inventories  under the ITP tax poses several troublesome  problems.
First, the ability of profitable  businesses to "zero out" their tax
liability  with sufficiently  large investment  programs  is likely  to cause
perception  problems in many developing  countries.  This result is, of
course, inherent in the allowance for expensing  of fixed assets and
invsntories,  a common  feature  of  all  consumption-based  taxes.
Second,  new  and  rapidly  growing  capital-intensive  firms  are  likely
to be in a loss  position  for  tax  purposes. Accordingly,  the  treatment  of
losses  is critical  under  a consumption-based  business  tax.  Losses  cannot- 71 -
be deducted  from the individual  tax  base; this  precludes  business  losses
from being used to shelter  individual  compensation.  It is appropriate
that losses  be carried forward  indefinitely,  with interest  at a market-
based nominal interest  rate.  Such treatment  is essential  to reduce the
competitive  disadvantage  of new  firms,  relative  to  established  ones,  and  to
mitigate  tax incentives  for mergers,  takeovers  and buyouts.  (Even this
approach  will not totally  eliminate  the  problem,  since  it can  be expected
that the firms in question  cannot  borrow at the interest  rate used to
adjust  losses  carried  forward.)
4.  Treatment of Loans
Loans  have  no tax  consequences  under  the "tax  prepayment"  version
of the  business  tax,  as the  proceeds  of loans  are  not included  in the  tax
base and interest  payments  are not deductible. (This  is consistent  with
the  exemption  of interest  at the  individual  level  under  the  ITP  tax.) All
business  lending,  including  purchases  of another  firm's  bonds, is treated
in  a consistent  manner;  purchases  are  not  deductible,  and  interest  receipts
are not included  in the tax  base.  Such treatment  is consistent  with the
tax  treatment  of the  borrowing  firm,  which  does  not include  the  proceeds  of
the  loan  in the  tax  base  and  gets  no deduction  for  interest  paid.  It  also
guarantees  that  debt is treated  in the  same  way,  whether  held by firms  or
households.
As argued  above,  such  treatment  of loans  is  generally  much  simpler
than  that  under  an income  tax  or under  cash  flow  consumption  tax treatment
of loans  (which  requires  inclusion  of the  proceeds  of loans  in the  tax  base
coupled with deductions  for interest  paid and repayment  of principal).
However,  tax  prepayment  treatment  of loans  gives  rise  to two  opportunities- 72 -
for tax  avoidance.47  The first  is the  use  of installment  sales  to deter
tax liability  when the purchaser  is not subject  to taxation  under the
consumption-based  business  tax.  (The  purchaser  might  be an individual,  a
tax-exempt  institution  or a foreigner). In principle,  an installment  sale
should  be treated  as a cash sale at the time of purchase  coupled  with a
loan.  However,  under  a cash flow  business  tax, installment  sale payments
would  not be included  in the  gross  receipts  of the  seller  until  received.
This  would  result  in  an opportunity  to  defer  tax  without  penalty,  since  the
interest  on the  installment  sale  loan  would  not  be included  in  the  tax  base
of the seller. 48 In order to eliminate this avoidance possibility,
installment  sales to entities other than taxable businesses could be
treated  as  cash  sales  at the  time  of  purchases,  with  subsequent  installment
sale  payments  having  no tax  consequences. 49
The second  problem  caused  by tax prepayment  treatment  of loans
occurs  when a taxable  business  is simultaneously  trading  in goods and
borrowing/lending money with an entity that is not  subject to the
consumption-based  business  tax. If the  taxable  firm  is a seller/lender,  it
has an incentive  to couple  sales  at an understated  price  with an above-
market  interest  rate  on the  loan,  since  the interest  received  would  not  be
included  in gross  receipts. If the firms  is a buyer/borrower,  it  has an
incentive  to strike  a deal for an inflated  purchase  price  coupled  with a
below-market  interest  rate,  since  only purchases  are deductible  from the
47/  These avoidance  problems  are outlined  in the discussion  below.  For
more thorough  explanations,  see McLure,  Mutti, Tbht.-onyi  and Zodrow
(1987).
48/ If the  purchaser  were  a taxable  business,  there  would  be little  problem
since  the deferred  receipts  of the seller  would  be offset  by deferred
deductions  for  the  buyer.
49/  Note  that  similar  problems  with  installment  sales  arise  under  an income
tax.- 73 -
base  of the  business  tax. In  both  cases,  the  entity  that  is  not  subject  to
the consumption-based  business  tax  would generally  be indifferent  to the
price/interest  rate  manipulations  described.
Solutions  to these problems  are far from obvious.  They would
likely involve interest rate floors and ceilings, would be somewhat
arbitrary,  and would  be difficult  to administer  and  enforce. 50 rhus,  in
these cases, the use of tax prepayment treatment of loans would not
simplify  the tax structure;  rather  it would require  anti-avoidance  rules
that  would  complicate  the  tax  structure  while  at  best  only  limiting  abuses.
5.  Stock  Purchases
In general, business  deductions are  allowed only for real
investment  outlays. Thus,  business  purchases  of another  firm's  stock  are
not deductible,  and dividends  are not included  in the tax base.  Such
treatment  is consistent  with the  tax treatment  of the firm  whose  stock  is
being  purchased,  since  it does  not include  the  proceeds  of the  stock  sale
in the  tax  base  and  gets  no deduction  for  d1vidends  paid.
6.  Treatment of  Land
The treatment  of land  must  also  be specified. The  most  consistent
approach  is to allow expensing  of the cost of land purchased,  with the
proceeds of land sales included in the business tax base; under this
approach,  buying  and selling  land other  than that associated  with owner-
occupied  housing  would  be deemed  to be a business  activity. However,  to
minimize  transitional  problems  or to tax land differentially,  it may be
desirable  simply  to  exclude  land  purchases  and  sales  from  the  business  (and
50/  Alternatively  cash flow treatment  could  be required  for such "linked"
loans;  such treatment  would  clearly  be very complicated  from  both an
administrative  and  a compliance  standpoint.- 74 -
individual)  tax  base,  except  for  firms  whose  business  is  buying  and  selling
land.  Presumably  no attempt  would  be made in this case to isolate  and
allow  an exemption  for the  portion  of gross  receipts  that is attributable
to land; this  would imply  that  the marginal  effective  tax rate on income
from  capital  invested  in land  would  be the  statutory  rate,  rather  than  the
marginal effective tax rate of zero applied to income from all other
capital investment.  Initially,  this treatment  would distort investment
decisions  away from  land,  but the  final  equilibrium  result  should  be lower
land values with few real effects on resource allocation.  (The most
important  effect  on resource  allocation  would  probably  be a disincentive  to
conversion  Df land from agricultural to urban uses, an  important
phenomenon  in  most  developing  countries.  Whether  this  would  be detrimental
or beneficial  cannot  be known in general.) Such an approach  would cause
serious  administrative  problems  because  of the  need to separate  the  values
of land and structures  and the strong  incentives  to recharacterize  non-
deductible  land  purchases  as deductible  purchases  of structures.
7.  Fringe  Benefits  and  Mixe4  Business/Personal  Purchases
The  taxation of employet-provided fringe benefits would be
problematical  under  an ITP  consumption  tax,  as it is  under  an income  tax.
The existence  of fringe  benefits  (other  than pensions  or other directly
labor-related  payments),  as that term is usually  understood  in developed
countries,  is generally  less  prevalent  in  developing  countries  than  in  more
advanced  countries,  and therefore  less  of a problem. But  the  provision  of
consumption  benefits  such  as  housing  and  cars  that  are  exempt  in  practice,
if not by law, to owners  and managers  of business  firms  and independent
professionals  may  be every  bit  as  much  of  a problem.
The  most  straightforward approach would  be  to deny  firms
deductions for fringe benefits and for the costs of all expenditures- 75 -
representing  consumption  on the  part of owners  or employees. Rules  would
be drawn  as tightly  as possible  in order  to capture  as much  as  possible  of
the personal  consumption  component  of the tax  base (e.g.,  no deductions
would be allowed  for  meals,  entertainment,  automobiles  with an important
personal  use component,  etc.).  Although  relatively  simple,  this  approach
would  effectively  tax  benefits  at the  firm's  rate  which,  as argued  above,
should  equal  the  individual  maximum  rate. 51
Such treatment  would probably  be justified  in the case of most
fringes and consumption  benefits, especially since this rate could  be
avoided  at the  discretion  of the  taxpayer  by making  cash  payments,  rather
than  payments  in  kind.  However,  the  result  is a disincentive  to  providing
fringe  benefits  to lower-rate  employees.  Such a disincentive  would be
undesirable  to the extent that employer  provision  of certain  goods  as
fringe  benefits  is economically  efficient;  for  example,  employer  provision
of some benefits  may allow economies  of scale to be realized,  and the
provision  of health  care insurance  to all employees  of a firm  may be an
effective  way to deal  with the adverse  selection  problem. An alternative
would  be to allow  a partial  deduction  for fringes,  which  would  subsidize
high-rate employees  while providing  less of a disincentive  to low-rate
employees.
Another  approach  would  be to treat  the costs  of providing  fringe
and other  benefits  as income  to be imputed  to employees.  Firms  could  even
be given  the  option  of imputing  benefits,  rather  than  having  deductions  for
51/  No rule in this area can be truly  simple,  because  in many cases,  it
would  be difficult  to determine  which  costs  should  be allocated  to the
provision  of fringe  benefits.  Furthermore  there is a grey area of
workplace amenities between essential business expenditures and
provision  of consumption  benefits  to  employees.- 76 -
their  costs  disallowed. Such  a procedure  would  eliminate  the inefficieincy
problem, but would result in a significant  increase  in administrative
complexity.  In addition  to the problems  mentioned  above, it would be
difficult  to determine  how costs allocated  to fringe  benefits  should  be
allocated  among  employees.
The  tax  treatment  of  business  purchases  and  sales  of
"collectibles'  presents  serious  problems  under a consumption  tax (as it
does under an income  tax).  We recommend  no special  treatment;  that is,
business  purchases  and sales  of collectibles  should  be treated  on a cash
flow basis.  Such an approach implies that the personal consumption
component  of  such  items would  escape  tax;  it  also opens  evasion
possibilities  in the form of non-reporting  of sales of collectibles.
However,  cash flow treatment  of such transactions  eliminates  the  need for
complex  and  somewhat  arbitrary  rules  defining  "collectibles"  and  specifying
which firms  deal in "collectibles"  and thus should  be allowed  deductions
for  purchases  with inclusion  of sales. 52
S.  Consistency  with  Financial  Accounting
The simplicity  features  of the  ITP approach,  which  are its  major
advantage,  are achieved  primarily  by avoiding  many of the complex  issues
involved  in measuring  real economic  income  properly. Accordingly,  since
the tax base  is not  income, the accounting information  required to
determine  the tax  base is not sufficient  to determine  income  as required
for financial purposes.  Accurate financial accounting  would require
52/  Note,  however,  that  cash  flow  treatment  of  business  purchases  and  sales
of collectibles  coupled  with tax  prepayment  of such  transactions  at the
individual  level gives rise to tax avoidance  opportunities. For a
discussion  of this issue, see McLure, Mutti, Thuronyi,  and Zodrow
(1987).- 77 -
precise measurement of income (including  adjusting for inflation  and
dealing  with  all  timing  issues  properly).
This divergence  between  tax  and financial  accounting  has several
implications.  It is clear  that  some  of the  simplicity  gains  obtained  with
the ITP  approach  are lost in the  sense  that  financial  accounting  is still
complex even if tax accounting  is much simpler.  However,  all of the
information  required  to prepare  tax returns  is certainly  included  in the
information  required  for accurate  financial  accounting,  so introducing  an
ITP consumption  tax would add little complexity to private  accounting
procedures while greatly simplifying  tax procedures.  In particular,
auditing and monitoring taxpayer  compliance  should  be somewhat  simpler
because  measurement  of the  tax  base is  simpler.  Moreover,  even  if financial
accounting  practices  do not conform  to the  principles  of accurate  income
measurement,  tax distortions  and opportunities  for tax evasion  would not
arise if the tax base were calculated  according  to the rules of an ITP
consumption  tax.
9.  Using  Reduced  Interest  Payments  to  Reduce  Prices
A difficult  problem  common  to an ITP  consumption  tax (and  the ICF
tax, a comprehensive  income  tax, and a value added tax) occurs  when a
business  engages  in linked  transactions  with  its  customers  in  which  it  pays
relatively  low rates  of interest,  while  simultaneously  reducing  the  price
of goods  and services  sold  by the business. Under the  consumption-based
business  tax, this  results  in the substitution  of tax-reducing  price  cuts
for  non-deductible  interest  expense,  producing  an artificially  low  level  of
gross  receipts  and thus  an understatement  of tax  liability. In theory  the
general  principle  to  be applied  is that  market  rates  of interest  should  be
imputed  to customer  balances  so that artificially  low gross receipts  are
not reported.- 78 -
The  two most prominent examples of this problem occur with
financial institutions  and life insurance  companies.  In the case of
financial  institutions,  a typical  example  is  a  bank  which  provides  services
such as checking  accounts  and automatic  tellers  and takes  payment  in the
form of reduced  interest  payments  on deposits. A similar  problem  arises
with life insurance  companies  that  pay relatively  low  rate  of interest  on
the cash value of policies in exchange for charging relativell  small
premiums for life insurance  coverage.  In both cases,  the conceptually
correct solution is to impute  a market returr  to consumer  balances --
deposits  in the  bank case and  the  cash  value  of policie3  in the  insurance
case. However,  such  treatment  would  clearly  increase  the  complexity  of the
ITP  consumption  tax  and  is  not  recommended.
10.  Leasing
-easing transactions  would be handled like all other  bus ness
transactions  under the consumption-based  business  tax.  The lessor  would
expense  purchases  and  include  lease  payments  in  receipts. The  lessee  would
get  a deduction  for  those  lease  payments.
It is interesting  to  note  that  simultaneous  borrowing  and  leasing,
say  of business  equipment,  generally  would  not confer  an advantage  to the
borrower  relative  to simply  purchasing  the  equipment;  this  is true  even if
interest payments  are  fully  included  in the  lease  payment.  The
borrower/lessee gets a full deduction for lease payments, and thus
effectively  gets  an interest  deduction. However,  the  lender/lessor  has to
include the entire lease payment in taxable gross receipts, and thus
effectively  is taxed  on interest  income.  As long as the tax rates  of the
two businesses  are equal,  there is no particular  advantage  to leasing,
relative to purchasing. Note that this result  does not obtain if the
lessor is a tax-exempt  entity; this implies that the leasing/lending- 79 -
activities  of such institutions  should  be taxed in order to eliminate
opportunities  for  abuse. Finally,  leasing  by the  domestic  financial  sector
should generally pose no problems, provided that the lease payments
received  by the  financial  institution  were  subject  to tax.
The possibility of simultaneously  leasing and borrowing from
foreign  financial  institutions  would  open  an  avenue  for  abuse.
Specifically,  domestic  firms  could  arrange  for inflated,  fully  deductible
lease  payments,  coupled  with an artificially  low interest  rate.  Such an
arrangement  would lower  the tax liability  of the domestic  firm since the
inflated  deductions  for  the  lease  payments  would  be fully  deductible  while
the  interest  payments  are  non-deductible  in  any  event; it  would  presumably
be a matter  of indifference  to the foreign  financial  institution  which
would include  both interest  receipts  and the lease  payments  in its  income
tax  base.  Substantial  administrative  vigilance  would  be required  to  detect
this  type  of abuse.
B.  International  Issues
1.  Exports  and  Imports
The treatment  of exports  and imports  under  the  business  tax  must
be specified.  The  most straightforward  approach  is to include  the  value  of
exports  in gross  receipts  and allow  deductions  for  only the  domestic  cost
of imported  inputs;  that is, in sales tax terminology,  the tax  would be
assessed  on an origin  basis.  Such treatment  would  be inconsistent  with
the destination  principle  treatment  normally  used with a value added  tax
(taxing  imports  and exempting  exports). In a world  with floating  exchange
rates,  the choice  between these  two methods  is unlikely  to have a major
effect on international  competitiveness  in the long run. 53 However,
53/  See  McLure  (1987).- 80 -
because exchange rates do not adjust instantaneously  and are affected
significantly  by movements  of portfolio  capital,  there  could  be prolonged
periods  following  a tax  change  in  which  competitiveness  and  the efficiency
of international  trade  and  capital  allocation  would  be affected. Moreover,
an  origin-based  would  probably  suffer  from  adverse  perception  effects. A
more serious  problem  is that of documenting  and  monitoring  the value of
exports,  especially  to foreign  affiliates.  This is a standard  problem
under  the  origin  principle.
2.  Treatment  of Investment  by Foreigners
The second  critical  international  issue  is the  determination  of the
treatment  of foreign  investment,  given  the fact that implementation  of a
consumption  tax in any developing  country  would  occur  in a world in  which
all other nations  would, at least in principle,  continue  to use income
taxation  for  at least  a significant  period  of time. To avoid  revenue  loss,
the developing  country adopting an ITP consumption  tax might consider
income  taxation  of foreign  investment  as an alternative  to extending  the
benefits  of consumption  tax treatment  to foreign  investment. Of course,
this would be denounced by capital-exporting  countries (and it might
jeopardize  foreign  tax credits  otherwise  allowed  by such countries). If
this approach  were deemed to be undesirable,  revenue objectives  could
presumably  be achieved  by assessing  withholding  taxes on dividends  and
interest  paid  to foreigners.
Alternatively,  if foreign  firms  paid significant  amounts  of tax
under consumption  tax rules,  another  potentially  critical  problem  would
arise. 54 epecifically,  it would be important to structure the tax
treatment  of foreign investment  in such a way that foreign  tax credits
54/  For a more thorough discussion  of this issue, see McLure, Mutti,
Thuronyi,  and  Zodrow  (1987).- 81 -
provided  in countries  such as the United  States  would be available  for
taxes  paid  under  an ITP  consumption  tax  regime. It is  unclear  whether  this
would  be possible  for  an ITP  consumption  tax,  since  it  can  be argued  that  a
tax which disallows  interest  deductions  is not a tax on net income,  and
thus  does  not  satisfy  the  controlling  criterion  for  being  creditable  in the
U.S, 55 56  Finally,  it must  be noted  that too  much can easily  be made of
the issue of creditability,  especially  in the United States.  Recent
changes  in U.S. law will result  in many firms  having  paid more foreign
income  taxes  than  they  can  credit  in the  United  States;  that  is,  they  will
be in an excess  foreign  tax  credit  position. For these  firms  it may  make
relatively little difference  whether a consumption-based  business tax
levied  by a developing  country  is  creditable.
3.  Taxation  of Foreign  Investment  Income
At the individual  level,  foreign  (as  well as domestic)  capital
gains,  interest  receipts,  and  dividends  received  would  presumably  be exempt
from tax  under  the ITP  approach. In many developing  countries,  including
those that nominally employ  the worldwide  principle,  this would simply
formalize existing practice.  The primary result of adopting the ITP
consumption  tax  approach  would  be to  put  domestic  and  foreign  investment  on
an equal  (tax-exempt)  footing,  which  would  likely  increase  the  fraction  of
domestic  funds  invested  at  home.
55/  It is interesting that the U.S. raises no similar objections to
provisions  of the  income  taxes  of other  countries,  such  as accelerated
depreciation,  that  are  equally  inconsistent  with  the  basic  rationale  of
income  taxation  but  reduce  taxes  rather  than  raising  them.
56/  Whether this obstacle  could be circumvented  by allowing  an interest
deduction and then levying a withholding  tax on interest  paid to
foreigners at the business tax rate is unclear.  Certainly this
approach would be questionable  if applied in cases covered  by the
relatively  few  tax  treaties  between  developing  and  developed  countries.- 82 -
The treatment of foreign investment  and foreign-source  income
received by domestic firms would also have to be determined.  Under
consistent  application  of the  consumption-based  business  tax  on a  worldwide
basis,  a deduction  would  be allowed  for foreign  business  investment,  and
foreign-source  business income  would be subject to tax; by comparison,
foreign  investment  by individuals  would  be treated  on a tax  prepaid  basis.
Most consumption  tax proponents  advocate  implicitly  allowing  a deduction
rather than a  credit for foreign taxes paid; that is, the receipts
attributable  to foreign  investment  and included  in the  firm's  business  tax
base would  be net of any foreign  taxes  paid,  and no additional  deductions
or credits  would be allowed. 57 (Foreign  taxes  paid by individuals  on
income from capital  would be of no relevance,  since the foreign-source
income  would  be exempt  from  tax.)
An obvious problem with this approach is the difficulty in
ensuring  that  the  return  to foreign  investment  is included  in the  business
tax  base.  Accordingly,  it  might  be desirable  to require  separate  accounts
for  foreign  investment  and  prohibit  the  use  of foreign  losses  or deductions
to offset  domestic  income;  allocation  of costs  between  domestic  and  foreign
operations  would  be a source  of complexity  and  potential  abuse  under this
approach.
57/  Note that the allowance  of a deduction  rather  than a tax credit  for
foreign  taxes  paid is  consistent  with  a tax  policy  goal  of  maximization
of national  income. By comparison,  allowing  a tax  credit  implies  the
policy goal of maximization  of worldwide income (or achieving an
efficient  worldwide  allocation  of capital).  See Musgrave  (1969)  or,
for  a more  recent  exposition  of these  points,  Rosen  (1985).- 83 -
Another  problem  with this  approach  is that  taxpayers  could  invest
abroad  both as individuals  and through  their  own businesses. This would
result  in  possibilities  for  taxpayers  to "game"  the  tax  system  by assigning
deductions  and/or  losses  to business  cash flow accounts  while receiving
individual  tax  prepayment  or exemption  for  income  and/or  gains. Monitoring
such  transactions  would  be important  but difficult. One  possible  solution
is to require  individuals  to treat  foreign  investment  on a cash  flow  basis
in  a segregated  account  --  or  an individual  foreign  investment  "basket."  In
any case, it is unclear  w'.iether  such opportunities  for international  tax
evasion  are  any  worse  under  a consumption  tax  than  they  are  under  an income
tax.
A more  drastic  solution  is simply  to ignore both  foreign
investment  and  the  returns  to foreign  investment  for  domestic  tax  purposes
for both  individuals and businesses. This would effectively be tax
prepayment treatment for businesses  (as  well as individuals),  since  no
deduction would be  allowed for  foreign investment and the receipts
generated  be such investment  would  not be included  in the tax  base.  As
demonstrated  in Section  II,  such  treatment  is generally  roughly  equivalent
to cash flow treatment. In particular,  in the case  of foreign  investment
it is similar  to the  cash  flow  approach  described  above,  as it effectively
implies  that  a deduction  rather  than  a credit  is allowed  for  foreign  taxes
paid;  this true is because returns to domestic  investors  are net of
foreign taxes paid, but no tax credits are allowed.  Again, cost
allocation  would  result  in  difficult  problems.
Finally,  note  that  the  considerations  relevant  to  the
determination  of the appropriate  tax treatment  of foreign-source  income
under  the  ITP  tax  are  generally  the  same  as those  under  an income  tax. The
major  difference  may  be one  of  perception. Specifically,  if the  exemption- 84 -
of crpital income  under the ITP tax were coupled  with an exemption  of
foreign-source  labor income,  most citizens  working abroad  would pay no
taxes  to their  home country. It is possible  that this  would  be perceived
as  unfair,  and that  pressure  for the taxation  of such income  would be
greater  than if the  capital  income  of such individuals  were subject  to a
domestic  income  tax.
C.  Transitional  Issues
Since  individual  transitional  issues  were  discussed  in Section  IV,
this  discussion  focuses  on  business  transitional  issues. For  business,  the
primary transitional  issues  are the tax treatments  of income  flows and
deductions  attributable  to investments  made prior to the switch  from an
income-based  to  a consumption-based  tax.
On the  income  side,  accurately  identifying  returns  from  pre-reform
investments  would  be very difficult; accordingly,  full inclusion  of all
investment  returns  in the business  tax base seems  to be the only viable
option. Note that  interest  income  would  generally  not be included  in the
business  tax base;  however,  to the extent  phase-in  rules  were applied  to
the  elimination  of interest  deductions  on indebtedness  existing  at the  time
of reform,  the same rules  should  apply  to the elimination  of taxation  of
interest  income  from  pre-existing  debt.
On the  deduction  side,  the  primary  business  issues  involve  the  tax
treatment  of interest,  depreciation,  amortization  and similar  deductions
attributable to investments  existing at the time of enactment of the
consumption  tax.  One possible  approach  is the set of transition  rules
proposed  by Aaron  and  Galper  and  described  and  discussed  at some  length  in
Section  IV.
To the extent that investment  is very heavily debt-financed  in
developing  countries,  it may be desirable  to provide for more generous
transitional  treatment in the case of  the elimination of  interest- 85 -
deductions. For example,  the elimination  of interest  deductibility  could
be phased-in  over  a period  of years.  Alternatively,  special  grandfathering
provisions  could provide for full deduction  of an amount of interest
related  to  the  amount  of outstanding  debt  prior  to  the  enactment  of reform,
with these  provisions  being  phased-out  over  time. In either  event  it  would
seem appropriate  to allow  continued  deduction  of depreciation  allowances,
following  the  schedule  in  effect  at the  time  assets  were  placed  in  service.
This brief discussion  suggests  that  business  transitional  issues
are difficult and that no consensus exists regarding the appropriate
treatment  of income  and deductions  attributdble  to investments  existing  at
the time of enactment. Nevertheless,  these  transitional  problems  do not
appear to be  insurmountable, and are typical of those faced in any
comprehensive  reform  proposal,  including  income  tax  reform.
D.  The  Desirability  of  a Supplementary  Wealth  Tax
It is quite conceivable  that an ITP consumption  tax would be
supplemented  in a developing  country with a wealth tax, specially in
countries  which  already  have such a tax.  This is especially  true to the
extent  that  an ITP  tax  is appealingprimarily  for  its  simplicity  properties.
Viewed  from  this perspective,  the exemption  of capital  income  on marginal
investments  is an implication  of the  consumption  tax  technique_rather  than
an explicit  goal  of tax  reform.  Accordingly,  a supplemental  wealth  tax,
whi-h  would  represent  a tax  on the  present  value  of capital  income,  may  be
desirable  to achieve  vertical  equity  goals,  to tax the  capital  income  of
only wealthy individuals,  to reduce  concentrations  of wealth,  or to tax
additionel  "ability  to  pay"  not  captured  in  the  ITP  tax  base.- 86 -
Alternatively,  note that the ITP tax base includes  gifts and
inheritances  received. Since  evasion  and  avoidance  are  notorious  problems
for these two items,  and estate and gift taxes are also exceedingly
difficult  to administer,  the wealth tax could also be viewed as a very
rough  proxy  for  the  inclusion  of gifts  and inheritances  in the tax  base  of
the recipient.  This rationale for wealth taxation  is obviously  quite
tenuous,  especially  since  it  may not  be much  easier  to tax  net  wealth  than
to tax  gifts  and  bequests.
In any  case,  it  must  be noted  that  accurate  measurement  of  wealth
in practice  requires  accurate  measurement  of income;  this in turn implies
the multitude  of income  tax problems  described  in Section  III.  With a
supplemental  wealth  tax,  this complexity  would  be limited  to a relatively
small  number  of  high  income  individuals.  However,  in  principle,  the  values
of all business  holdings  should  be included  in the wealth tax base at
current  market  value;  this implies  that all firms  should  be valued  using
accurate  income  measurement  principles. In addition,  it should  be noted
that  the  information  required  to  measure  wealth  accurately  is  not  available
from tax returns filed under an ITP consumption  tax; much additional
computation  would  be required  to  calculate  the  wealth  tax  base.
Alternatively,  the wealth tax base could be limited to assets
whose  values  could  be easily  determined  or approximated  (such  as land,  real
property,  and securities  listed  on public  exchanges),  or very rough  but
simple  rules  could  be used to  determine  the  value  of assets  included  in  the
wealth  tax base.  Such a limited  wealth  tax would probably  resemble  the
property  taxes  currently  employed  in.  many developing  countries.  To the
extent  it  applied  to  publicly  traded  securities  it  would  retard  achievement
of open  capital  markets,  a goal  of many  such  countries.- 87 -
E.  The  Desirability  of Presumptive  Taxation
Widespread  under-reporting  of  income and  tax  evasion  are
commonplace  problems  under the income  taxes of developing  countries.  A
tool that is sometimes  used to combat  these  problems  is the taxation  of
"presumptive"  income.  One approach  is to determine  net wealth  and then
calculate  presumptive  income  (from  capital)  as the product  of net wealth
and some rate  of return  on such  net  wealth;  if  presumptive  income  exceeds
reported income,  the tax base under the income  tax becomes presumptive
income.  (Presumptive  income  is also sometimes  calculated  on the  basis  of
gross  receipts.) This approach  is based  on the  notion  that  assets  are in
many cases  more difficult  to conceal  from tax administrators  than is the
income generated  by those assets, so that the taxation  of presumptive
income  is an effective  way to ensure  that cax evaders  pay at least  some
taxes.
In principle, the wealth-based approach to the  taxation of
presumptive  income serves  as a type of minimum  tax on capital income.
Since  capital  income  is effectively  excluded  from tax  under  a consumption
tax,  such  an  approach  to  the  taxation  of presumptive  income  is
fundamentally  inconsistent  with taxation  on the  basis  of consumption.
Nevertheless,  tax evasion  would certainly  be a problem  under a
consumption tax.  Accordingly, it would be useful if some type of
presumptive  taxation  could  be instituted  that would be consistent  with
taxation  on the  basis of consumption. Unfortunately,  such  a system  would
be very  difficult  to  design. For  example,  firms  could  evade  tax  under  the
consumption-based  business  tax  by under-reporting  gross  receipts. However,
there  is no necessary  relationship  between  a firm's  assets  and its  gross
receipts. Alternatively,  a firm  could  under-report  gross  receipts  and  then
under-report  wages  paid in  order  to  avoid  paying  withholding  taxes  on those
wages.  Again,  it  would  be difficult  to require  the  payment  of withholding- 88 -
taxes on a presumptive  basis, since there is no particular  relationship
between  a firm's  assets  and  its  wage  payments.
One possible method of implementing  taxation  on a presumptive
basis  would be to estimate -- on an industry-specific  basis --  the
relationship  between  the  assets  of a "typical"  firm  and its  gross  receipts
and/or  wages paid.  Such an approach  would generate  "presumptive  gross
receipts"  or "presumptive  wages paid" for each firm on an industry-by-
industry  basis.  These  quantities  would then  be used in the determination
of tax  liability  (or  withholding  taxes  due)  if they  exceeded  the  quantities
reported  by the  firm.
Such  an approach  to taxation  on  a presumptive  basis  would  be quite
difficult  to  implement.  Even modestly  accurate  estimates of  the
relationships  between  a firm's  assets  and its  gross  receipts  and/or  wages
paid  would  be difficult  to obtain  in  a developing  country. Administration
would  be difficult,  especially  since  different  rules  should  in principle  be
applied to each of a wide variety of industries. The system  would be
arbitrary  in  many  if  not  most  cases,  and  the  burden  of presumptive  taxation
would most likely vary considerably  across  industries  and across firms
within  industries.  Such  presumptive  taxation  thus  would  be both  unfair  and
distortionary.  It  would  no doubt  correctly  be perceived  as such,  and  would
result  in significant  political  opposition. For  all of these  reasons,  we
recommend against  the  inclusion of presumptive  taxation within  a
consumption  tax  framework,  even though  it  would  in  principle  be beneficial
to  have some type  of system  that  would  effectively  ensure  that  tax  evaders
paid some  minimum  amount  of tax.
Note also that taxation on the basis of consumption  would be
simpler  than the tax systems  currently  utilized  by developing  countries.
As a result,  adoption  of a consumption  tax  would  mean that  resources  could- 89 -
be diverted  from the interpretation,  explanation,  and administration  of
complex  income  measurement  rules  to administering  and enforcing  a simpler
consumption-based  system.  This  should  result  in more  effective
administration  and enforcement,  which  is clearly  a superior  way to improve
compliance than is an indirect  and rather arbitrary approach such as
presumptive  taxation.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Musgrave  (1987, p.  250) has  recently argued that developing
countries  should  facilitate  capital  formation  by taxing  consumption  rather
than saving,  especially  the luxury  consumption  of relatively  high income
individuals  who  are  the  source  of private  sector  domestic  saving. He notes
that a direct progressive  expenditure  tax is the "obvious"  tax policy
choice;  however,  he also  argues  that  a  personal  expenditure  tax (of  the  ICF
type)  is not  feasible for developing countries due to its inherent
complexity.
In this report,  we have  argued  that  the  advantages  of taxation  on
the  basis  of consumption  can  be achieved  without  the  complexity  implied  by
taxation  of individuals  on a cash flow basis.  Specifically,  we believe
that direct taxation  on the basis of consumption  is a feasible  policy
option for a developing country provided that the tax system  has the
following features.  First, the tax on individuals  should follow the
relatively  simple  "tax  prepayment"  approac.a  rather  than the  more familiar
"cash  flow"  approech. Second,  the  individual  tax  base should  include  gifts
and inheritances  received,  and the individual  rate structure  should  be
characterized  by progressive  marginal  rates.  Third, the individual  tax
should  be supplemented  by a flat-rate  "consumption-based"  business  tax  that
provides  for tax  prepayment  treatment  of debt and interest  and applies  to- go  -
all business entities of sufficiently  large size.  Finally,  if deemed
desirable, this consumption tax system could be  supplemented by an
individual  wealth  tax.
To support  this  position,  we have  provided  detailed  discussions  in
this  report  of (1)  the  differences  between  income  and  consumption  taxes  and
the  major  structural  features  of the  direct  consumption  tax  outlined  above,
(2) the  relative  merits  of  the  income-based and  consumption-based
approaches to direct taxation in terms of the standard criteria of
simplicity,  equity, economic  neutrality  and efficiency,  and consistency
with economic  growth,  (3)  the  choice  between  cash flow  and tax  prepayment
treatment  at the individual  level  under  a direct  consumption  tax,  and (4)
the structure and implementation of such a direct consumption tax,
including  international  and transitional  issues  and the desirability  and
feasibility  of supplementary  wealth  taxes and taxation  on a presumptive
basis.
Of course,  with the  exceptions  of the  brief experiences  in India
and Sri  Lanka  cited  above,  no country  has attempted  direct  taxation  on the
basis  of consumption  rather  than  of income. A natural  question  is  whether
this  fact  indicates  that  such  a reform  is  politically  impossible.  Although
we obviously  can not answer  this  question  definitively,  we would like  to
make the  following  four  points.
First,  and most obvious,  is that we believe that the arguments
made above  present  a compelling  case that  a direct  consumption  tax  of the
type described  is a feasible  policy  option,  from the standpoint  of both
economics  and politics.  Second,  some of the political  opposition  to a
direct consumption  tax is based on the belief that it is hopelessly
complicated  from an administrative  standpoint;  although  this  may well be
true  of the individual  cash flow approach,  we believe  that  a consumption
tax based on the individual  tax prepayment  approach  is  iministratively- 91  -
simpler than either an income tax or a consumption  tax based on the
individual  cash  flow  approach.
Third, the tax systems of many countries already have many
features  typical  of the  consumption  tax  approach,  especially  in the  form  of
various  saving  and  investment  incentives.  Indeed,  "income"  taxation  at the
firm level is in many cases more generous than that prescribed by a
consumption-based  business  tax  (as  the  combination  of investment  incentives
and  full  deduction  for  nominal  interest  expense  produces  marginal  effective
tax rates  on capital  investment  that are  commonly  negative,  especially  at
high  inflation rates), while  the taxation of capital income at the
individual  level is far from comprehensive. Thus, in many cases it is
unclear that a movement to taxation the basis of consumption  would
represent  as dramatic  a political  change  as is commonly  argued;  certainly
it need not  result  in a reduction  in the  taxation  of income  from  business
and  capital.
Final 1v,  we note that the question of the appropriate tax
treatment  of existing  wealth  should  be separated  from the  question  of the
treatment  of wealth  accumulated  after  the enactment  of a consumption  tax.
Tax  reform  discussions  should  focus  on  whether  consumption  tax  treatment  of
new wealth  is  acceptable  from  a political  standpoint;  as long  as there  is
sufficient  flexibility  in the  choice  of transition  rules,  the  treatment  of
existing wealth can be as lenient or as harsh as deemed politically
acceptable.
We conclude  by noting  that  we have purposely  kept our  discussion
very general so that it would be as widely applicable  as possible.
However, an obviously interesting  direction for future research is a
numerical analysis of the revenue and distributional  effects of the
implementation  of the  direct  consumption  tax  system  described  above  in  some- 92 -
specific  developing  country.  Such an analysis  should  include  a complete
specification  of transition  rules,  calculate  time  paths  of tax rates  that
would  hold revenues  constant  (or increase  them by some specific  amount),
and consider both long run and transitional  revenue  aad distributional
effects. We  hope to  conduct  such  an analysis  in  a future  report.- 93 -
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